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NEW YORK'S JUVENILE OFFENDER
LAW: AN OVERVIEW AND ANALYSIS
John P. Woods*
I. Introduction
In March of 1978, two men were shot to death on the New York
City subway system. In another instance, two men were seriously
wounded by gun shots. The gunman in each of these instances was
a fifteen year old boy named Willie Bosket, Jr. Although Bosket
had committed a number of violent crimes in the past, the maxi-
mum possible sentence for these murders was a five-year "place-
ment"' which was in fact ordered on June 29, 1978.2 The outrage
which arose when Bosket's crimes were made public was height-
ened when another vicious murder was committed by a thirteen
year-old.3
In response to the public furor which arose as a result of these
incidents, Governor Hugh Carey called the New York legislature
into Extra-Ordinary Session seeking to revise the laws governing
juvenile crime. The state legislature, pursuant to the Governor's
request, enacted the Crime Package Bill' which made major revi-
sions in the entire criminal justice system. The Bill, which pro-
* Member of the New York Bar. Assistant Corporation Counsel, City of New York. B.A.
1968, Fordham University. J.D. 1975, St. John's University. L.L.M. 1980, New York Univer-
sity School of Law. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and not
those of his employer. The author would like to express his gratitude and indebtedness to
Linda Nealon, Esq. for her help in the research and writing of this article. The author would
also like to acknowledge the assistance of Iris Coleman.
1. In New York State until 1978, juveniles convicted of any crime were subject not to
incarceration in adult prisons but rather to "placements" in juvenile facilities run by the
Division For Youth ("DFY"). For a detailed explanation of court placements, see text ac-
companying notes 77-93, 105-14, 132-34 & 192-208 infra.
2. N.Y. Times, June 30, 1978, at 1, cols. 3, 5. Bosket was subsequently sent to the DFY
facility at Goshen from which he escaped after his sixteenth birthday. N.Y. Times, Decem-
ber 27, 1978, § 2, at 2, col. 1. For that escape he was given a four-year sentence as an
adult--only one year less than his sentence for two homicides. If Bosket had been treated as
an adult, he could have received anywhere from fifteen years to life imprisonment. See N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 125.25, 70.00(2), (3) (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1979).
3. See Matter of Felipe 0. N.Y.L.J. Feb. 6, 1979 at 12, cols. 2-3.
4. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 481. The bill was introduced on July 14, 1978, passed the state
assembly by a vote of 125-10 and was signed into law six days later. It has no legislative
history. See Thorpe, Juvenile Justice Reform, 15 TiAL 22 (1979).
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vided New York with one of the harshest juvenile justice systems
in the country,5 introduced mandatory sentencing for adults, made
fourteen and fifteen year-olds criminally responsible for fourteen
different crimes and made thirteen year olds responsible for mur-
der. The Crime Package Bill created a complex judicial system
with two sets of prosecutors, three classes of offenses, three sepa-
rate courts, at least six stages at which a juvenile can be removed
from the adult to the juvenile justice system and four types of sen-
tencing. This system has proven to be both inefficient and
ineffective.
This Article will first examine the historical development of the
present juvenile justice system. Second, New York's juvenile court
system as well as recent reforms in this system will be analyzed.
Finally, this Article will explore the problems created by the Crime
Package Bill and further determine whether the reforms enacted
by the state legislature have resulted in a more effective juvenile
justice system.
II. Historical Development of Juvenile Justice
Anglo-American jurisprudence, concerned with the theory of
mens rea, has never satisfactorily developed a system to handle
crimes committed by those felt to be incapable of possessing crimi-
nal intent.0 Courts, in an attempt to resolve this dilemma, often
resorted to arbitrary distinctions.
At early common law, it was believed that a child under seven
lacked the requisite state of mind necessary to commit a criminal
act, whereas a child over seven was responsible for his acts.7 Ac-
cording to Blackstone, by the fourteenth century, the law had de-
veloped that a child under fourteen and over seven was presumed
doli incapax, that is, unable to discern right from wrong. However,
if the presumption were rebutted, the child could suffer capital
5. Peyser, The New Juvenile Offender Law in New York: A Comparison with Other
Jurisdictions, N.Y.L.J. September 27, 1978, at 1, col. 1. New York is only one of four states
to end juvenile court jurisdiction at age 15. Nine states end it at 16, thirty seven states at 17
and one state at 18.
6. See generally Prevezer, A Historical Summary of the English Juvenile Court System
and an Assessment of Its Features in the Light of American Practice, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 1
(1957).
7. Id. at 3; Note, The Young Offender: Jurisdiction, 17 BROOKLYN L. REV. 216, 217
(1951).
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punishment.8 Juveniles were in fact executed with some frequency
for a variety of offenses.9 Children convicted of felonies were often
sentenced to corporal punishment such as mutilation and whip-
ping.10 When prisons became common, juveniles were sent to adult
penitentiaries where conditions were frequently atrocious.1
Further compounding the inability of the legal system to deal
effectively with juvenile criminals was the idea, basic to Anglo-
American criminal jurisprudence, that criminal laws were intended
to punish criminals, not rehabilitate them.1 2 As nineteenth century
reformers became increasingly aware that the criminal system in-
stead of training "its bad boys so as to make them decent citizens
.. .permitted them to become outlaws and outcasts of society,"' 8
they sought to make fundamental changes in the juvenile system.
Reformers first developed the theory that the state, acting as
parens patriae, should provide for the treatment and rehabilita-
tion of the juvenile. To effectuate this goal, the New York House of
Refuge was founded in 1824. The founders of the House argued
that by taking the juvenile out of his home and separating him
from bad influences, he could be rehabilitated.14 Children were
placed in the Refuges on an informal basis without a hearing or
actual proof of criminal offenses. The Refuges only housed a small
percentage of all juvenile offenders, leaving the remainder to the
streets or to the adult penitentiary system. Those that were sent to
the Refuges were not necessarily in a better position."
8. 4 Blackstone, COMMENTARIES *23.
9. See Prevezer, supra note 6, at 3. "Felony" was a very expansive term at English law.
Capital crimes included destroying the heads of fishponds and being in the company of
gypsies. Id. Fine distinctions were also made as to the mode of punishment. In one reported
case, a thirteen year old girl murdered her mistress, a treasonable offense. Because the law
did not permit anyone under 14 to be hanged, the girl was burned to death. 1 Hale P.C.
p. 26, 1. Y.B. 12 Ed.W. III, under Pleas of the Crown.
10. 2 ABBOTT, THE CHILD AND THE STATE 324 (1938).
11. Due to these harsh alternatives, juries would frequently acquit.cMennel, Origins of
the Juvenile Court: Changing Perspectives on the Legal Rights of Juvenile Delinquents, 11
CalM. L. Q. 68 (1972).
12. See generally Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104 (1909).
13. Id. at 107. See also Lindsey, Historical Sketch of the Indeterminate Sentence and
Parole System, 16 J. CraM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1925); W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENCING
21-23 (1978).
14. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187,
1188-93 (1970).
15. Many of the Refuges deteriorated into sweat shops. They also used an updated ver-
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Late nineteenth century reformers sought alternatives to the
Refuges and the abominable prison conditions in which children
were placed.' 6 In 1899, reformers in Cook County, Illinois enacted
a statute creating the first juvenile court.17 New York, following
the lead of the Illinois reformers, granted criminal courts the dis-
cretion to try children under fourteen accused of felonies that were
not capital crimes for a misdemeanor. Subsequently, the age at
which this could be done was raised to sixteen and this procedure
became mandatory.' 8
The New York Penal Law of 1909 provided that a child of more
than seven and less than sixteen years who committed any act or
omission which if committed by an adult would be a crime, would
not be guilty of a crime but would be guilty of juvenile delin-
quency. 9 Such a delinquent could be committed to "any incorpo-
sion of the old English punishment of transportation by sending their charges to farms in
the West. Id. at 1189-91, 1200-01, 1209-12, 1225-29.
16. While these reforms were originally hailed as great progressive social changes, THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE OF JUVENILE COURTS, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CHARITIES AND CORREC-
TION, 358-59 (1904); H. Lou, JUVENILE COURTS IN THE UNITED STATES, (1927), more recent
research has expressed strong reservations about this assumption. See generally Mennei,
supra note 11, at 69; A. PLATT, THE CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINQUENCY (1969);
C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 310-13 (1978); Note, Rights and Reha-
bilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 281 (1967).
17. 1899 Ill. Laws at 131, §§ 1, 21. One of the early judges of that court discussed its
goals and procedures in a much-quoted article:
Why is it not just and proper to treat these juvenile offenders, as we deal with ne-
glected children, as a wise and merciful father handles his own children whose errors
are not discovered by the authorities? Why is it not the duty of the state, instead of
asking merely whether a boy or girl has committed a specific offense, to find out what
he is, physically, mentally, morally, and then if it learns that he is treading the path
that leads to criminality, to take him in charge, not so much to punish him as to
reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush but to develop, not to make him a
criminal but a worthy citizen.
The child who must be brought into court should, of course, be made to know that
he is face to face with the power of the state, but he should at the same time, and
more emphatically, be made to feel that he is the object of its care and solicitude.
The ordinary trappings of the courtroom are out of place in such hearings. The judge
on a bench, looking down upon the boy standing at the bar, can never evoke a proper
sympathetic spirit. Seated at a desk, with the child at his side, where he can on occa-
sion put his arm around his shoulder and draw the lad to him, the judge, while losing
none of his judicial dignity, will gain immensely in the effectiveness of his work.
Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REv. 104, 107, 120 (1909).
18. 1905 N.Y. Laws ch. 655.
19. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186 (McKinney 1909) (amended 1949, 1950, 1956, 1962).
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rated charitable reformatory, or other institution" for a period up
to three years. These children were not to be sent to adult prisons
or otherwise to be associated with adult criminals.'0 However, a
child over seven and under sixteen charged with a crime punish-
able by death or life imprisonment2 ' could be indicted, tried and
convicted in the same manner as an adult. 2" A sixteen year-old,
regardless of the charge involved, was an adult, and was treated
accordingly.
By the turn of the twentieth century, the first children's court
was established in Manhattan as part of the Court of Special Ses-
sions."3 In 1922, Children's Court became a division of the Domes-
tic Relations Court of the City of New York." Analogous courts
were established in the rest of the state but with no consistent
statewide law as to jurisdiction, procedure or venue.2' The Chil-
dren's Court had jurisdiction over, inter alia, delinquent" or ne-
glected children and mental defectives.2 7 Hearings were held before
a judge in a closed courtroom with relaxed rules of evidence.28 If
20. Id. §§ 486, 2194. The Children's Court Act had a similar provision. See text accom-
panying notes 23-29 infra. N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 21 (McKinney 1922) (repealed 1962).
21. These crimes included first and second degree murder, kidnapping, treason and
lynching. Note, Criminal Law-Capacity of Minor of Fifteen, 23 BROOKLYN L. REV. 300, 300
n.2 (1957).
22. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 2186(c) (McKinney 1909) (amended 1949, 1950, 1956, 1962).
There was a rebuttable presumption that a child under 12 was incapable of committing a
crime. Id. § 817.
23. Note, Criminal and Delinquent Minors in the Courts of New York City, 14 BROOK-
LYN L. REV. 102, 105 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Delinquent Minors].
24. N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 5(1) (McKinney 1922) (repealed 1962).
25. Oughterson, Family Court Jurisdiction, 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 467 (1963).
26. The definition of delinquency included the commission of a large number of non-
criminal acts. See N.Y. Dom. REL. CT. AcT § 2(12) (McKinney 1945) (repealed 1962); N.Y.
CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 2 (McKinney 1922) (repealed 1962):
The words "delinquent child" shall mean a child under sixteen years of age (a) who
violates any law or municipal ordinance or who commits any act which, if committed
by an adult would be a crime not punishable by death or life imprisonment; (b) who
is incorrigible, ungovernable or habitually disobedient and beyond the control of its
parents, custodians or other lawful authority; (c) who is habitually truant; (d) who,
without just cause and without the consent of his parent, parents, guardians or other
custodian, deserts his home or place of abode; (e) who knowingly engages in any occu-
pation which is in violation of law; (f) who frequents any place the existence of which
is in violation of law; (g) who habitually uses obscene or profane language; or (h) who
so deports himself as to wilfully injure the morals or health of himself or others.
27. N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT. AcT § 5 (McKinney 1922) (repealed 1962).
28. Delinquent Minors, supra note 23, at 106.
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the juvenile was found to be a delinquent, the court could either
suspend judgment, place him on probation or commit him to an
institution for an indefinite period. 9
Unfortunately, the juvenile courts in New York and elsewhere
rarely fulfilled their goal of reforming the wayward youth. The
courts tended to be chronically understaffed and underfunded and
failed to attract and retain the best level of judicial talent.8 0 In
practice, the juvenile frequently received "the worst of both worlds
• ..neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children." '
Despite the many procedural defects of the juvenile court sys-
tem, it was more than sixty years before the United States Su-
preme Court scrutinized such proceedings. In Kent v. United
States,3 ' a sixteen year-old charged with rape, robbery and house-
breaking challenged a ruling by a juvenile court waiving jurisdic-
tion over his person even though he was subject to the "exclusive"
jurisdiction of the juvenile court under District of Columbia law.83
The juvenile court judge had remitted the juvenile to trial in a dis-
trict court without holding a hearing or conferring with the defen-
dant, his parents or his counsel. Kent was subsequently indicted
and convicted as an adult, for housebreaking and robbery, and sen-
tenced to thirty to ninety years in prison. The Supreme Court, in
overturning the conviction, held that the determination whether to
transfer a juvenile from juvenile court to district court is "critically
important"8' to the juvenile. Therefore, the Court held that as a
condition to a valid waiver order, a juvenile is entitled to a hearing
that "must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair
treatment" 5 but need not "conform with all of the requirements of
a criminal trial. . ... 81 A juvenile's counsel in such a proceeding,
according to the Court, is entitled to access to the juvenile's
29. N.Y. DOM. REL. CT. Acr § 83 (McKinney 1945) (repealed 1962); N.Y. CHILDREN'S CT.
AcT § 22 (McKinney 1922) (repealed 1962).
30. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 n.14 (1967) (a quarter of the juvenile court judges
nationally had no law school training and that half had no undergraduate degree).
31. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (footnote omitted).
32. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
33. Id. at 543.
34. Id. at 560.
35. Id. at 562.
36. Id.
[Vol. IX
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records as well as to a statement of reasons for the court's decision
concerning the juvenile.3 7
A year later, the Supreme Court in In re Gault"5 held that the
fundamental right to due process guaranteed that a juvenile be
given adequate notice of the charges, the right to counsel, confron-
tation and cross-examination and the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation. Gerald Gault, a fifteen year-old charged with juvenile de-
linquency for making obscene telephone calls, was convicted at a
trial at which no one was sworn, no complainant appeared, and no
record of the proceedings was prepared.3 9 He was sentenced to six
years in the State Industrial School for an offense for which an
adult could have received not more than two months imprison-
ment. The Supreme Court in overturning Gault's conviction recog-
nized that a "juvenile is not entitled to bail, to indictment by
grand jury, to a public trial or to trial by jury."40 However, the
court made clear that "[u]nder our Constitution, the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court. 41
The Supreme Court in In re Winship,4' expanding upon the due
process rights enunciated in Kent and Gault, held that a juvenile
is constitutionally entitled to proof beyond a reasonable doubt
during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceeding. How-
ever, in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania," the Supreme Court ruled that
the Constitution does not require a jury trial in the adjudicative
phase of a state juvenile court delinquency proceeding."
In view of the fact that many states considered juvenile proceed-
ings civil and not criminal,4 the juveniles were not accorded all the
37. Id. at 557.
38. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
39. Id. at 5.
40. Id. at 14. See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 n.22.
41. 387 U.S. at 28.
42. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
43. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
44. In Matter of D., 27 N.Y.2d 90, 261 N.E.2d 627, 313 N.Y.S.2d 704 (1970), cert. denied,
403 U.S. 926 (1971), the New York Court of Appeals held that a juvenile defendant is not
entitled to a jury trial as a matter of state law. The New York court also ruled that the
procedural requirement of notice under the Code of Criminal Procedure (the predecessor
statute to the New York Criminal Procedure Law) does not apply to family court procedure.
45. See, e.g., the District of Columbia statute involved in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S.
541, 554 (1966), which designated juvenile proceedings as civil rather than criminal.
1980]
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rights of an adult in a criminal trial."0 However, the Supreme
Court's rulings on the constitutional rights guaranteed to a juvenile
have required major changes in the handling of juvenile cases in
courts throughout the country.
III. New York's Juvenile Justice System
A. The Family Court Act
The New York Family Court Act"' which in 1962 superseded the
old Children's Court system, embodied most of the due process
protections that were to be required by the Supreme Court in
Gault.4 8 The Family Court Act was enacted as part of a general
revision of the New York court system. It placed in one court cases
encompassing different aspects of the same problem, namely, the
breakdown of family life. Family courts were given jurisdiction
over juvenile delinquents, persons in need of supervision, neglected
children, as well as paternity, support, custody, adoption and visi-
tation proceedings.19 It was believed at the outset that the family
court would be able to apply a unified approach to these related
problems. It was also felt at the time of the bill's enactment that
the best interests of the child could still be considered in the con-
text of due process.50 Unfortunately, the Family Court Act has
been as unsuccessful as its predecessors in dealing with the prob-
46. Id. at 555.
47. 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686. See generally, Paulsen, The New York Family Court Act,
12 BuFFALo L. REV. 420 (1963).
The Act has its own vocabulary. The juvenile is a "respondent" rather than a defendant.
A "petition" rather than an indictment or a criminal information, is filed against him. Fol-
lowing a "fact-finding hearing" as opposed to a trial, the juvenile may be found to have
committed an "act, which if done by an adult, would constitute a crime." At the "disposi-
tional hearing," which is analogous to sentencing in the adult system, the delinquent may be
"placed" rather than incarcerated.
In this Article, the terms juvenile, youth and child will be used interchangeably to de-
scribe a person under the age of 16. The terms conviction and crime will sometimes be used
to describe, respectively, "fact-finding" and "an act, which if done by an adult, would con-
stitute a crime," in order to avoid circumlocution.
48. The New York Family Court Act was praised in Gault several times. 387 U.S. at 40,
48, 55-57. See Note, The Gault Decision and the New York Family Court Act, 19 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 753 (1968).
49. 1962 N.Y. Laws ch. 686, § 115.
50. Oughterson, Family Court Jurisdiction, 12 BUFFALO L. REV. 467 (1963); N.Y. FAM.
CT. AcT, Art. I (McKinney 1975) D. Bersharov, Practice Commentaries [hereinafter cited as
Commentaries].
[Vol. IX
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lem of juvenile crime.
1. Procedural Framework
The general scheme of the Family Court Act has not changed
substantially since 1962.51 A juvenile arrested for a crime52 is either
released by the police to his parents or other person legally respon-
sible for his care or brought directly to family court or to a court-
designated juvenile detention facility.53 In court, he is referred to
the Intake Bureau of the Family Court Probation Department.
Probation Intake screens out neighborhood disputes and trivial in-
cidents of non-criminal conduct. These cases can either be "ad-
justed at intake" or "terminated without adjustment."" If the case
is not resolved in Intake, it is referred to a prosecuting attorney.
The attorney at this juncture reviews the case for legal sufficiency
and may either decline to prosecute or draft a petition."' If a peti-
tion is filed,56 the juvenile is brought before a family court judge
for arraignment. At arraignment, he can either be paroled to an
appropriate person or remanded for detention." The juvenile can
be remanded if the court finds that there is a substantial
probability that he will not return to court or that he will engage
51. However, changes have been made with respect to the dispositions available for cer-
tain crimes. See text accompanying notes 105-14, 132-34, 192-208, infra.
52. Family court jurisdiction extends only to crimes. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(a) (Mc-
Kinney 1975). "Crimes" under New York law are defined as either felonies or misdemean-
ors. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(6) (McKinney 1975).
53. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 724 (McKinney 1975).
54. Id. § 734. Adjustment at intake involves a determination by the probation officer not
to refer the charges to the prosecutor. This type of action is taken where the charges are felt
not to merit court intervention or where the victim and the juvenile reach some form of
agreement. A case will be terminated without adjustment where the complainant does not
come forward. The juvenile is not entitled to counsel at this stage of the proceedings. Matter
of Anthony S., 73 Misc. 2d 187, 191, 341 N.Y.S.2d 11, 15 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
55. No petition may be filed without the approval of the prosecuting attorney. N.Y. FAM.
CT. AcT § 734-a(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
56. Id. § 731. The petition must allege not only a crime but that the juvenile is in need
of supervision, treatment, or confinement. See also Matter of Jaime T., 96 Misc. 2d 173, 181,
408 N.Y.S.2d 901, 907 (Fam. Ct. 1978). Section 733 of the New York Family Court Act sets
forth who may originate the proceedings.
57. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 739(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Out of 17,880 juveniles arrested
in New York State in 1979, only 17% were detained but a full 83% were not. Office of Court
Administration, Second Annual Report of the Chief Administrator of Courts [hereinafter
cited as 1979 Annual Report].
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in other criminal acts.'8 Such a remand 9 can initially only be for a
three-day period. The remand cannot be extended past the initial
three days unless "special circumstances" exist or the court finds
that probable cause exists to believe that the juvenile is a juvenile
delinquent. The remand then can be extended another three court
days or for fourteen days if the juvenile is charged with a class A,
B or C felony.e0
Family court delinquency fact-finding hearings are actually fully
litigated "criminal" trials differing from adult trials only by the
absence of a jury.61 At trial, a juvenile is represented at all stages
DETAINED LENGTH OF DETENTION IN DAYS
BEFORE DAYS 91- 181- 365 or
PETITION PETITION TOTAL 1-7 8-14 15-21 22-30 31-90 180 365 more
212 2818 3030 957 406 309 296 669 147 31' 3
6.9% 93.1 100 32 13 10 10 22 5 1 .1
Id. at Tables 3-63, 3-64.
A third alternative at arraignment is remand to a "shelter." This alternative would apply
where it is found that a juvenile is neither dangerous nor likely to flee and where no relative
has appeared to take custody of him.
There is no provision for bail in the statute.
58. Id. § 739 (a). The preventive detention provision has been found to be constitutional
on the curious ground that it protects the child. People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39
N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1976).
Another challenge to the preventive detention provision is currently awaiting decision in
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. United States ex
rel. Martin v. Strasberg, Civ. No. 77-6176 (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 21, 1977).
59. In New York City remands to detention are made to the Spofford Juvenile Detention.
facility.
60. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACr §§ 739(b), 747 (McKinney 1975). The first section was added to
the Family Court Act in 1975 in response to People ex rel. Guggenheim v. Mucci, 32 N.Y.2d
307, 312, 298 N.E.2d 109, 112, 344 N.Y.S.2d 944, 948 (1973) which read the Act as requiring
a probable cause hearing within three days. This section has created numerous practical
problems. One problem is whether the juvenile is entitled to a probable cause hearing in a
situation where he is not prepared for a full trial but the prosecutor'is prepared. The Appel-
late Division, Second Department, has held that a probable cause hearing is required. Peo-
ple ex rel. Kaufmann v. Davis, 57 A.D.2d 597, 598, 393 N.Y.S.2d, 746, 748 (2d Dep't 1977).
61. For example, N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 744(a), (b) (McKinney Supp. 1979) sets forth
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by a "law guardian"as who must be an attorney admitted to prac-
tice in New York.e8
The majority of petitions filed in family court are disposed of
without the juvenile being convicted." A substantial number of pe-
titions are dismissed before trial for failure to prosecute. 65 Others
are withdrawn by the prosecutor" or dismissed for failure of proof
at a hearing.67 By far the largest number of dismissals occur when
the juvenile is granted an adjournment in contemplation of dismis-
sal ("ACD")." Where the juvenile is convictedi either upon a guilty
plea or after trial, a dispositional hearing is scheduled to determine
whether the juvenile is in need of supervision, treatment or con-
"beyond a reasonable doubt" as the standard of proof and limits the admissibility of evi-
dence to that which is "competent, material and relevant."
62. Id. §§ 241-249 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1979).
63. Id. § 242 (McKinney 1975). In New York City, an indigent juvenile is usually repre-
sented by the Juvenile Rights Division of the Legal Aid Society or by an attorney appointed
by the Family Court Indigent Panel. See id. § 249 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Juveniles whose
parents have resources may, of course, engage their own attorney.
Originally, there was little or no provision for prosecutors in the Family Court Act. The
evidence would be presented by police officers, social workers and other untrained individu-
als. They were frequently no match for trained defense attorneys. See Commentaries, supra
note 50, § 254. For the last ten years, petitions have been presented in New York City by
the corporation counsel's office and in other counties by the county attorney. N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 254 (McKinney 1975). See also Commentaries, supra note 50, § 254. In New York
City, the Family Court Division of the corporation counsel presently has more than 40 attor-
neys assigned to present family court cases with the overwhelming bulk of these cases being
delinquencies.
64. In 1979, 17,655 delinquency petitions were filed in New York State: 15,554 against
boys and 2,101 against girls. Sixty-five percent of those cases were dismissed without a con-
viction. 1979 Annual Report, supra note 57, at Tables 3-65, 3-66. The conviction rate for
adults charged with felonies is somewhat higher; 56% were convicted of some crime but only
15% of a felony. Felony Arrests: Their Prosecution and Disposition in New York City's
Courts, VEIA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE 1-9 (1977).
65. This is usually attributable to witnesses' failure to come forward. Four percent of the
total cases filed were dismissed for this reasons. 1979 Annual Report, supra note 57, at
Tables 3-65, 3-66.
66. Twelve percent of the juvenile petitions filed in New York in 1979 were withdrawn
by the prosecutor. Id.
67. Five percent of the petitions filed (933 petitions) were dismissed for failure of proof
at a hearing. Id.
68. This is a procedure under which the petition can be adjourned for up to six months
with the imposition of terms and conditions of conduct upon the juvenile. If the juvenile
does not violate these terms, the petition will be dismissed. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 749(a)
(McKinney 1975).
Twenty-seven percent of all petitions filed were disposed of by means of an ACD. 1979
Annual Report, supra note 57, at Tables 3-65, 3-66.
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trol.s ' The usual procedure is for the court to order a probation
"Investigation and Report" ("I and R") to determine, inter alia,
the child's family background, school record and court history. The
court can also order a Bureau of Mental Health study ("BMHS")
of the juvenile by a court psychiatrist and direct that placement be
explored. At this stage in the proceeding, the juvenile is usually
paroled or remanded. Remand to detention can be for an initial
period of ten days followed by another ten days. Following this
period, the juvenile can be continued on remand only on a showing
of "special circumstances. 7 0 The juvenile's only remedy for an im-
proper detention is a writ of habeas corpus in New York supreme
court.
71
At a dispositional hearing, the juvenile, again represented by
counsel, can call witnesses in his behalf and cross-examine wit-
nesses testifying against him.7 2 At disposition, the court has nu-
merous alternatives. It can dismiss the petition finding that, de-
spite the fact that the juvenile committed an act which would be a
crime if he were an adult, the juvenile is not in need of supervision,
control or treatment.73 The court can suspend judgment for up to a
year7 or grant the juvenile an adjournment in contemplation of
dismissal.7' It can also place the juvenile on probation for a period
of up to two years.76 The vast majority of juveniles are routinely
69. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 746(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
70. Id. § 749(b) (McKinney 1975). These so-called "special circumstances" are left unde-
fined in the statute and case law.
71. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAW §§ 7002, 7010 (McKinney Supp. 1980). The likelihood of success
is poor. Frequently, judges sitting in these cases reserve decision until the return date in
family court, thereby causing the writ to become moot.
72. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 743 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
73. See id. § 751 (McKinney 1975). See also id. § 731(c). In 1979, this occurred in five
percent of the cases in New York State in which juveniles were found to have committed a
crime. 1979 Annual Report, supra note 57, at Tables 3-65, 3-66.
74. N.Y. PAM. CT. AcT § 755 (McKinney Supp. 1979). If "the court finds at the conclu-
sion of that period that exceptional circumstances require an additional period of one year,"
the court may so extend the duration of the suspended judgment. Id. Conditions for sus-
pended judgment can include restitution or services for the public good. Id.
Suspended judgment was applied in 12% of the cases in which findings were made. 1979
Annual Report, supra note 57, at Tables 3-65, 3-66.
75. N.Y. PAM. CT. AcT § 749(a) (McKinney 1975).
76. Id. § 757. Exceptional circumstances can extend probation another year. Id.
Probation is the most common disposition, used in 55% of all cases where a fact-finding
was made. 1979 Annual Report, supra note 57, at Tables 3-65, 3-66.
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disposed of under these provisions. The balance of the juveniles
that require placement are those that require particular scrutiny.
2. Placement
Placement can be in the child's home, with another suitable per-
son, or in an institution." Institutional placements are either to a
private agency affiliated with the Commissioner of Social Service
("CSS")78 or to the Division For Youth ("DFY") which maintains
its own facilities.
CSS facilities are generally residential schools contracted by the
state to take delinquents. They retain the option of rejecting
youths they deem unsuitable for their programs. Juveniles with
records of extensive mental illness or convictions for arson or sex-
ual offenses are often rejected by the private agencies. The only
alternative for these youths is placement with DFY which cannot
reject juveniles.79
77. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 756(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Placements in the home of a
relative or other suitable person are rare. Only 17 such placements were made in 1979. 1979
Annual Report, supra note 57, at Tables 3-65, 3-66.
If the court orders placement, it may first order that the juvenile continue on remand
until he is actually transported to the facility. At times where DFY or the private facilities
are short of beds, this may result in long stays in detention awaiting transportation. In
People ex rel. Dale v. Davis, N.Y.L.J., April 17, 1978, at 14, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. April 5, 1978),
aff'd, 63 A.D.2d 866, 404 N.Y.S.2d 933 (1st Dep't 1978), a juvenile's challenge to the consti-
tutionality of such proceedings was rejected.
However, DFY agreed on July 9, 1980 to a stipulation and order in the case of Ronald W.
v. Hall, Civ. No. 80-1795 (S.D.N.Y. filed March 31, 1980). This stipulation binds DFY to
designate a particular facility and transfer each juvenile in detention to that facility or one
in its class, unless there are no vacancies in that category within 15 days. If at the end of the
15 day period no vacancy is available the juvenile must be transferred to the particular
facility or one within its class. If at the end of the 30th day there is no vacancy, then DFY
must go to court for an order to show why the transfer should not be effected.
78. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 756(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1979). CSS placements constituted
more than one-third of all placements made in New York State in 1979. 1979 Annual Re-
port, supra note 57, at Tables 3-65, 3-66.
79. See Cohen, Juvenile Justice: New York's Act is Hard to Follow, 13 TRIAL 28, 34
(1977). See, e.g., Matter of David R., N.Y.L.J. March 18, 1980, at 11, col. 4 (Fam. Ct. Feb.
21, 1980). David had a history of psychiatric disturbances and repeated non-violent delin-
quent behavior. Although placed in a CSS facility, David absconded many times and was
subsequently arrested for other crimes. The probation officer explored 18 different private
facilities for David. David was either rejected by the facility or the facility was deemed
inappropriate by the court. In addition, he was unwilling to go to the only facility appropri-
ate for him, i.e., a psychiatric hospital. He was eventually placed with DFY Title III, see
note 82 infra and accompanying text, because no other alternatives were open to him.
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DFY placements are either to "Title Ir' or "Title III" facilities.8 0
Title II facilities are generally urban residences, that is, group
homes or camps. Those juveniles who are placed in urban resi-
dences usually remain in the community and attend community
schools. However, they retain limited personal freedom. Juveniles
who require removal from the community but not necessarily to a
secure setting are placed in camps.81 Title III placements are for
juveniles who require structured settings."
Until 1976, all placements were made for an initial period of
eighteen months regardless of the crime for which the juvenile had
been convicted.88 Since 1976, the initial period of placement for a
misdemeanor has been reduced to one year.84 However, the place-
ment may be extended with court approval in increments of one
year up to the juvenile's eighteenth birthday. If the juvenile con-
sents, the extension may be made up to his twenty-first birthday. 5
A placement with DFY does not mean that a juvenile will neces-
sarily spend the entire period specified in the placement order in
such a facility. DFY retains the power to put a delinquent origi-
nally placed with Title III, in a Title II facility.8 Moreover, DFY
can release" or discharge" the delinquent when it believes that
suitable care and supervision can be provided and the juvenile's
return to the community would not endanger public safety. The
80. Title II and Title III refer respectively to N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 502-09 and §§ 510-27
(McKinney Supp. 1979). These are the statutes granting DFY the power to take custody of
these youths and describing the types of facilities in which they may be placed.
81. Interview with Iris Coleman, Court Liaison Officer of DFY, Bronx County, in New
York City (Aug. 1, 1980). Title II placements were made in seven percent of the cases where
a juvenile was found to have committed a crime. 1979 Annual Report, supra note 57, at
Tables 3-92, 3-93.
. 82. These programs have a high staff-juvenile ratio. Some settings severely restrict the
juveniles' access and movement. Education, psychological treatment and other services are
offered on an internal basis. Training is usually given in vocational subjects such as wood-
working, welding and auto mechanics. Id. Title III placements were made in ten percent of
the cases where the juvenile was found to have committed a crime. 1979 Annual Report,
supra note 57 at Table 3-92, 3-93.
83. The only exception to this was the situation of a fifteen year-old convicted of a class
A or B felony. See text accompanying notes 90-93 infra.
84. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 756(b) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
85. Id. § 756(b), (c) (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1979).
86. Interview with Iris Coleman, Court Liaison Officer of DFY, Bronx County, in New
York City (Aug. 1, 1980).
87. N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 523 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
88. Id. § 525.
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argument ostensibly can be made that according DFY broad dis-
cretion over the placement of a juvenile where there is no statutory
provision giving a juvenile. who is not transferred or released a
hearing, violates the non-transferred juvenile's right to due process
and equal protection. However, the procedures currently employed
by DFY militate against such a claim.89
Until 1976, fifteen year olds charged with class A or B felonies
were placed in a separate and distinct category. These juveniles
could be committed to the Elmira Reception Center ("Elmira") for
a period up to three years.90 Elmira was a medium security, adult
prison run by the Department of Correctional Services for offend-
ers ranging in age from sixteen to twenty-one.' 1 Placing a child in
an adult prison for three years without a jury trial raised constitu-
tional questions of due process and equal protection."e Neverthe-
89. The decision whether to place a juvenile placed in a Title III facility by a court, to a
Title II facility, is made after a meeting with the juvenile and his parents (if they are availa-
ble), and the juvenile's record is reviewed to determine how his needs can best be met. The
determination whether to release the juvenile earlier than required, is based on his or her
adaptation to the facility. Most Title III facilities award juveniles points for positive behav-
ior. After the juvenile has amassed a sufficient number of points, he is allowed to make
home visits and after a number of successful home visits, the juvenile might become eligible
for early release. Progress reports are filed out which the juvenile usually signs. Some facili-
ties even use charts to show a juvenile how well he or she is doing. Interview with Iris
Coleman, Court Liaison Officer of DFY, Bronx County, in New York City (Oct. 10, 1980).
The Supreme Court has held that a parole release hearing involves a liberty interest too
tenuous to require invocation of all the requirements of due process. Greenholtz v. Inmates
of'the Neb. Penal and Corrections Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 9 (1979). The New York statute
governing the early release of adult prisoners, N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 259-i (McKinney Supp.
1979), has been held, like the Nebraska statutory scheme, not to entitle a prisoner to all due
process protections. Boothe v. Hammock, 605 F.2d 661 (2d Cir. 1979). See also Bowles v.
Tennant, 613 F.2d 776, 778 (9th Cir. 1980); Wagner v. Gilligan, 609 F.2d 866, 867 (6th Cir.
1979). For a discussion of what was required for a parole release hearing in New York prior
to Greenholtz, see Coralluzzo v. New York State Parole Bd., 566 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 435 U.S. 912 (1978); United States ex rel. John-
son v. Chairman of N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 500 F.2d 925 (2d Cir.), vacated as moot sub
nom. Regan v. Johnson, 419 U.S. 1015 (1974).
90. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 758(b)(c) (McKinney 1975) (repealed 1976). Girls were sent to a
"suitable institution" such as Westfield state farm. Fifteen year-olds had been criminally
responsible as adults for crimes punishable by death or life imprisonment until 1967 when
the penal law extended to them the defense of infancy. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00 (McKinney
1967).
91. See Note, The Unique Status of the Fifteen Year Old under the Criminal Law in
New York, 39 ALB. L. REV. 297, 299 (1975). Statistics show that there were only about ten
commitments to Elmira per year.
92. United States ex rel. Murray v. Owens, 465 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); R. v. Cory, 44
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less, both federal and state courts sustained the statute, relying
upon McKeiver and the fact that the singling out of fifteen year
olds for separate treatment was not without reasonable relation to
permissible statutory goals.93
B. The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 ("JJRA")4 marked a
significant departure from the rehabilitative ideals first enunciated
by the Illinois reformers.9 5 The JJRA explicitly requires a family
court to consider the need for protecting the community as well as
the needs and best interests of the juvenile.96 The most significant
change97 made by the JJRA was the creation of a new class of
crime, the Designated Felony Act ("DFA")9 for which a "restric-
tive placement" could be made.99 A second change allowed district
attorneys to prosecute juvenile cases in family court.
1. The Designated Felony Act
The JJRA defined DFA's as acts done by a fourteen or fifteen
year-old which, if done by an adult, would constitute the crimes of
murder and attempted murder, manslaughter, robbery, kidnap-
A.D.2d 599, 353 N.Y.S.2d 783 (2d Dep't 1974); In re Garrett, 74 Misc. 2d 961, 346 N.Y.S.2d
651 (Fain. Ct. 1973).
93. See United States ex rel. Murray v. Owens, 465 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972).
94. 1976 N.Y. Laws ch. 878. For an interesting discussion of the JJRA see Comment,
The Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976: Operation Constitutional Vulnerability, and Ef-
fect, 6 N.Y.U. REv. L. AND SOC. CHANGE 217 (1977); Comment, The New York Juvenile
Justice Reform Act of 1976: An Answer to the Problem of the Seriously Violent Youth?, 45
FORDHAM L. REV. 408 (1976). Two legislative studies were conducted prior to enactment of
the new law. GOTFRIED, BARSKY & BARON, Juvenile Crime: Report of Recommendations and
Summary of Findings: New York State Assembly Committee on Child Care, 1976; Report of
the Governor's Panel on Juvenile Violence, 1976.
95. The JJRA was enacted in response to reports of particularly vicious juvenile crimes
which had not been deterred by the juvenile laws. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1975 (Maga-
zine), at 11, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 26, 1971, at 36, col. 4. See generally Comment, The
Juvenile Offender - Where Can We Send Him? 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 245 (1974).
96. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 711 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
97. The JJRA also enacted a number of procedural changes: requiring the judge to state
the reasons for a remand, id. § 739(a); for a fact-finding, id. § 752; or for a particular dispo-
sition, id. §§ 753-a(2), 754(2). Some provisions are ignored in practice, such as the one re-
quiring the same judge to preside at the fact-finding hearing and all subsequent hearings.
Id. § 742.
98. Id. § 712(h).
99. Id. § 753-a.
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ping, arson, burglary, assault, rape and sodomy.100 The legislature
felt, it was essential that the courts and other agencies concentrate
on juveniles charged with the most serious crimes. Consequently, a
number of provisions differentiated DFA's from ordinary delin-
quency cases. First, if a juvenile is charged with a DFA, this fact
must be noted conspicuously on the petition. 1'0 Second, in adjust-
ing a DFA petition at intake,10 2 the petition cannot be adjourned
in contemplation of dismissal, 03 and the written permission of a
judge is required. Third, a separate part in each family court was
established specifically to hear DFA petitions.'0"
2. Restrictive Placements
With regard to the dispositional alternatives available for DFA
offenders, the three-year commitment to Elmira was replaced by a
"restrictive placement." Inasmuch as a juvenile is afforded inten-
sive rehabilitative treatment in a setting removed from his previ-
ous environment, the ideals of the nineteenth century reformers
were not completely abrogated under the JJRA.10 5
Under the JJRA, a family court is required to determine within
twenty days of the fact-finding whether the juvenile requires a re-
strictive placement.'"s This determination is to be based upon an
extensive probation report'07 in addition to criteria set forth in the
100. Id. § 712(h). The various degrees of these crimes are set forth in the statute.
DFA's constitute a small percentage of total juvenile crime. In 1979, in Bronx County,
1,621 total petitions were filed. 1979 Annual Report, supra note 57, at 3-91, 3-92. Only 47
(9%) were filed as DFA's for an average of 12 per month. These figures were obtained from
an examination of the Bronx Family Court Docket Book.
DFA's do not encompass some of the most serious crimes. See text accompanying notes
210-11, infra.
101. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 731(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979); Commentaries, supra note 50,
§ 731(2).
102. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 734 (McKinney Supp. 1979). The former statute had prohib-
ited adjustment of class A or B felonies without the approval of the local probation director.
The difference appears to be insignificant.
103. Id. § 749(d)(i). It is doubtful whether very many viable cases with available wit-
nesses were adjourned in contemplation of dismissal under the old law because prosecutors
typically offer an ACD only when they have a weak case.
104. Id. § 117(b)(i), (ii). For crit icism of this reform, see text accompanying notes 239-
41, infra. Outside New York City, DFA's are to be given hearing preferences.
105. See People v. Young, 99 Misc. 2d 328, 330, 416 N.Y.2d 171, 172 (Fain. Ct. 1979).
106. N.Y. FAM. CT. AT § 753-a (McKinney Supp. 1979).
107. Id. § 750(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
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JJRA. °S If the court elects not to make a restrictive placement,10 9
the juvenile becomes subject to the normal range of dispositions
including an eighteen month placement in a Title III facility. If a
restrictive placement is ordered, and the juvenile has been con-
victed of a designated class A felony,110 placement with DFY must
be for an initial period of five years. The first twelve to eighteen
months are to be spent in a "secure facility"'' as designated by
DFY. After that period the juvenile must be placed in a residential
facility for twelve months. Tight restrictions are placed on DFY to
prevent release of a juvenile during these first two years of the
placement absent a court order or written approval from the Direc-
tor or Deputy Director of DFY." 2
108. The court considers the following criteria:
(a) the needs and best interests of the respondent; (b) the record and background of
the respondent, including but not limited to the information disclosed in the proba-
tion investigation and diagnostic assessment; (c) the nature and circumstances of the
offense, including whether any injury involved was inflicted by the respondent or an-
other participant; (d) the need for protection of the community; and (e) the age and
physical condition of the victim.
Id. § 753-a(2).
109. Id. As a general rule, the court is not required to order a restrictive placement.
However, a 1977 amendment to the Family Court Act mandates a restrictive placement
where the juvenile has inflicted serious physical injury upon persons 62 years old or older.
Id. § 753-a(2-a).
The constitutionality of this provision was sustained by the New York Court of Appeals in
Matter of Quinton A., 49 N.Y.2d 328, 402 N.E.2d 126, 425 N.Y.S.2d 788 (1980).
110. These are second degree murder, first degree arson and first degree kidnapping.
111. A "secure facility" is defined in the act as "a residential facility in which a juvenile
delinquent may be placed . . . which is characterized by physically restricting construction,
hardware and procedures, and is designated as a secure facility by the division for youth."
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 712(j) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
112. Id. § 753-a(3)(a)(i-iv). DFY has promulgated administrative rules to deal with
juveniles convicted of DFA's. These rules create two classes: (1) classified cases, i.e.,
juveniles convicted of DFA's upon whom the court elected not to impose a restrictive place-
ment and (2) restrictive cases, i.e., juveniles given a restrictive placement. NEW YORK STATE
DIvISION FOR YOUTH, Policy and Procedures Manual 2 (1978). Supervision of classified and
restrictive cases is to be more intensive, especially when the juveniles are not in a secure or
residential facility. Id. at 10-11.
Juveniles on restrictive placements may not be transferred from a secure facility before
the expiration of the secure term or from a Title III facility during the first 12 months after
admission. Id. at 13. Classified cases may not be transferred from a Title III facility for at
least 12 months after admission. Juveniles on restrictive placement may not be released
prior to the expiration of the residential and secure terms set by the court. They must
successfully complete at least two unaccompanied home visits. Id. at 14-15. They cannot be
discharged prior to the expiration of their placement. Id. at 15. Classified cases cannot be
released from a Title III facility for at least 12 months, id., or discharged prior to the expira-
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Where a juvenile is found to have committed a DFA other than
a class A DFA, the initial period of placement is for three years
with the first six to twelve months to be spent in a secure facility
and the next six to twelve months in a residential facility."' Both
types of placements can be extended by court order upon request
by DFY for one year intervals up to and until the juvenile's
twenty-first birthday.11
4
3. Prosecution of Juvenile Criminals
Until 1976, the Family Court Act specifically provided that all
juvenile prosecutions were to be initiated and handled by either a
county attorney or the corporation counsel of the City of New
York. District attorneys were excluded from family court in order
to preserve the noncriminal, rehabilitative nature of the proceed-
ings.115 Amendments to the JJRA in 1976 and 1978 for the first
time permitted district attorneys to prosecute juveniles charged
with having committed DFA's once an agreement had been
reached with either the corporation counsel or the county attor-
ney."' This change marked a significant departure from the reha-
bilitative ideals of the nineteenth century reformers, no doubt re-
flecting society's increasing concern with the problem of juvenile
crime and its desire to insure punishment of the worst juvenile
criminals. The corporation counsel and the county attorney's office
continue to prosecute all the non-DFA cases, the vast majority of
delinquency cases. As a consequence of these amendments, the
family court system has two sets of prosecutors-a system certain
to cause confusion.
The very definition of DFA's further confused the dual system.
DFA's are mainly crimes of violence in which "serious physical in-
tion of 18 months. Id.
113. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 753-a(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979). See note 110 supra. See also
Matter of Quinton A., 49 N.Y.2d 328, 334, 402 N.E.2d 142, 145, 425 N.Y.S.2d 788, 791
(1980).
114. Id. §§ 753-a(3)(d), 4(d).
115. See N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 254, Commentary (McKinney 1975).
116. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 254-a (McKinney Supp. 1979). Agreements were entered into
and district attorneys began to present DFA petitions in the fall of 1977. New York State
Division of Criminal Justice Services, Designated Felony Program Progress Report 1-17
(1978) [hereinafter cited as DF Progress Report]. See Matter of Samuel P., 424 N.Y.S.2d
837, 839-40 (Fam. Ct. 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 8, 1980, at 15, col. 5 (2d Dep't July 26,
1980).
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jury" was inflicted or in which a "deadly weapon" or "dangerous
instrument" was used. "Serious physical injury" is not clearly de-
fined in the penal law.' 17 The differences between "serious physical
injury" and "physical injury,"11 8 and thus between a DFA and a
non-DFA, is frequently a difference of opinion. The practical result
in borderline or difficult cases, is that complainants and police are
shuttled between the corporation counsel and the district attorney
while the respective attorneys debate whether the injury is "seri-
ous." This determination will in turn dictate whether the district
attorney or the corporation counsel will prosecute the case. The
district attorney retains the final word on whether to file a DFA.
Ironically, the district attorneys often reject cases that because of
their seriousness the corporation counsel wishes to file as DFA's.11
The JJRA was the first major revisions of the juvenile justice
system since the Family Court Act of 1962. The question still re-
mains as to how effective these reforms are in dealing with the vio-
lent juvenile criminal. In many instances, these revisions have had
contradictory effects. Although the new provisions were intended
to treat fourteen and fifteen year-olds more harshly than they had
been previously, statistics reveal that less than half of the petitions
filed as DFA's have resulted in DFA convictions and less than half
of the DFA convictions have resulted in restrictive placements.120
117. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(10) (McKinney Supp. 1979) provides that "serious physical
injury" is physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which causes death or
serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of health or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily organ.
118. Id. § 10.00(9). See People v. Almonte, 424 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819-20 (Sup. Ct. 1980) for
discussion of what constitutes a "physical injury."
119. There are some indications that the conviction rate of delinquents charged with
DFA's rose from 72% to 85% after the district attorneys assumed the role of prosecutor.
Similarly, the percentage of restrictive placements increased from 15% to 25%. The reliabil-
ity of the comparative figures is somewhat questionable. Indeed, the statistics from the ear-
lier period are described as "fragmentary and difficult to reconcile." DF Progress Report,
supra note 116, at 18-20, 26. These increases, if actual, are no doubt due to the amount of
staff assigned to these cases. In Brooklyn, for example, four assistant district attorneys were
assigned to handle a total of 98 DFA's filed between September 6, 1977 and April 30, 1978,
for an average of less than four cases per month per attorney. Even more remarkable is the
fact that only 32 cases, i.e., about one per month per attorney, went to trial. Id. at 6, 23, 26,
46. Figures in the other boroughs are similar. Id. at 42-45.
120. During an eight month period in New York City from September 6, 1977 through
April 30, 1978, 456 DFA arrests were made but 170 were rejected as DFA's by the district
attorney's offices and referred to corporation counsel. Thus, 286 DFA petitions were filed in
New York City (excluding Richmond County). Id. at 7-8, 27. Of those, 198 had completed
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Moreover, the DFA and restrictive placement provisions are in fact
less harsh than the former Elmira commitment which had pro-
vided for three years in an adult prison rather than in a juvenile
facility and which had covered all class A and B felonies rather
than just certain designated crimes. However, restrictive place-
ments have been ordered more frequently than Elmira
commitments.'21
4. The Juvenile Reform Amendment of 1978
In 1978 the state legislature, in an attempt to expand the effect
of the DFA and restrictive placement provisions previously en-
acted in 1976122 enacted a number of amendments to the Family
Court Act. 12 3 These amendments expanded the type of criminal ac-
tivity which constitutes a DFA.'2 4 In addition, the dispositional al-
ternatives available to a family court judge were increased.' 2 5
Third, the instances when the fingerprints of a juvenile could be
retained were broadened.' 2  Fourth, the cases which could be ad-
justed without court approval were enlarged to include many non-
violent acts.' 27
the fact-finding progress at the conclusion of the survey. 161 (85%) resulted in convictions,
but only 76 (47% of the convictions) led to convictions of DFA's. Id. at 9-11, 34-35. At the
end of the sample period, 55 of the juveniles convicted of DFA's had been placed. Twenty-
two received restrictive secure placements and twenty-nine received either Title II or III
placements. Id. at 14-15, 40.
121. Compare note 12 supra with note 91 supra.
122. See note 95 supra. See generally Note, Juvenile Justice: Alternative Answers, 40
ALB. L. REv. 179 (1975).
123. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 478.
124. See text accompanying notes 128-31 infra.
125. See text accompanying notes 132-34 infra.
126. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 724(a) (McKinney Supp. 1979) allows the police to take finger-
prints and photographs of any juvenile eleven years of age or older who is charged with a
class A or B felony and any juvenile thirteen years old or older who is charged with a class C
or greater felony. Section 753-b provides for the retention of the fingerprints and photo-
graphs if the juvenile is convicted of an act which if done by an adult would constitute a
felony. An exception exists with regard to eleven and twelve year olds. Their prints can be
retained only if they are convicted of class A or B felonies. Where the juvenile is subse-
quently convicted as an adult of a crime either before reaching the age of 21 or within three
years after his discharge from placement, whichever occurs later, the prints and photos be-
come a permanent part of his adult criminal record. If, on the other hand, the juvenile does
not have any adult convictions or pending charges which result in convictions by this time,
the records are destroyed. Formerly, the law had permitted retention of the prints only if
the juvenile had been convicted of a class C or greater felony. Id. § 753-b.
127. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 734(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
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The amendments expanded the scope of the DFA provisions"'8
in two ways. First, some provisions now extend to acts committed
by thirteen year-olds. Second, the amendments added two predi-
cate felony clauses to the statute. The law now includes as a DFA
an act committed by a fourteen or fifteen year-old which, if com-
mitted by an adult, would constitute second degree assault or sec-
ond degree robbery where the juvenile has a prior conviction for
such crimes or a prior conviction for a DFA or for what would have
been a DFA had the juvenile not been underage at the time he
committed the act.129
The other predicate felony clause makes a DFA any offense
"other than a misdemeanor, committed by a person at least seven
but less than sixteen years of age, but only where there have been
two prior findings by the court that such person has committed a
prior act which, if committed by an adult would be a felony. '1 30
This provision treats a non-violent recidivist as harshly as a violent
one.
81
The predicate felony sections have created serious problems. On
a practical level there is often a considerable lag in determining the
juvenile's prior record in other jurisdictions because such records
are not computerized statewide. Consequently, this information
oftentimes does not become available until after the petition has
been filed or after the case has been adjudicated. In addition, the
juvenile's family court findings are usually not available to the po-
lice when the juvenile is being processed. This prevents the police
from ascertaining whether a DFA or non-DFA offender is involved.
On the dispositional level, the amendments allow a court to im-
pose a maximum five-year restrictive placement on a juvenile
found to have committed his second DFA., 32 This is true even if
the predicate felony was not a DFA at the time the juvenile com-
mitted it. One amendment curiously shortened the period of place-
ment for misdemeanor offenses from eighteen months to a maxi-
128. Id. § 712(h).
129. Id. § 712(h)(iv).
130. Id. § 712(h)(v).
131. For example, a twelve year old with a predilection for stealing credit cards would
become a DFA offender upon his third conviction and upon a fourth conviction would be-
come a second DFA offender subject to the same five-year restrictive placement as would a
juvenile convicted of a class A DFA such as murder.
132. Id. § 753-a(5).
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mum initial period of one year.18 3 Another amendment allowed the
dispositional judge to "authorize" DFY to place a juvenile con-
victed of a non-DFA into a secure setting.3
In family court, the judge is the trier of the facts. 135 The Family
Court Act amendments requires that probation information not be
made available to the judge prior to disposition'" to insure that
the juvenile is accorded an impartial hearing. However, when a
judge is confronted with a petition prominently marked "Desig-
nated Felony,' 3 7 presented in the DFA part by a district attorney
charging a twelve year old with grand larceny, the judge must cer-
tainly realize that the juvenile has at least two prior felony
findings.
. This point has been raised routinely by law guardians. However,
courts have held that judges as trained triers of fact can disregard
their knowledge of a juvenile's record in reaching a conclusion as to
whether the juvenile has committed the alleged act. Therefore, a
contention that the juvenile is denied due process of law under
these circumstances will fail.' The Second Department has re-
cently held that the designation of a petition as a "Designated Fel-
ony Act Petition"'3 9 is proper at the fact-finding stage of a pro-
ceeding or only at the dispositional stage. In Matter of Luis R.,140
it was felt that no legitimate state interest is served by revealing a
juvenile's record to the court prior to a fact-finding hearing and
"can only cause mischief by needlessly calling into question the
impartiality and integrity of the court.' 4' The court in Luis R.
directed that such designation be made on the petition only after a
133. Id. § 756(b). This change is odd in light of one of the purposes of the amendment,
i.e., "tlo toughen the Juvenile Justice Reform Act of 1976 .... " News Memorandum of
State Executive Department, 1978 N.Y. Laws 1724.
134. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 756(a)(iv) (McKinney Supp. 1979). See Matter of John Ed-
ward B., 70 A.D.2d 1004, 1006, 418 N.Y.S.2d 186, 188 (3d Dep't 1979).
135. See Matter of Luis R., 98 Misc. 2d 994, 414 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Faro. Ct. 1979).
136. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 750(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
137. See text accompanying note 101 supra.
138. See, e.g., Matter of Robert D., 97 Misc. 2d 315, 411 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Fain. Ct. 1978);
Matter of James H., No. D3167/78 (Fan. Ct. Sept. 29, 1978); Matter of Juan R., No. D2891/
78 (Fam. Ct., Dec. 8, 1978).
139. Matter of Samuel P., 424 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Fain. Ct. 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 8,
1980, at 15, col. 5 (2d Dep't July 26, 1980). See also N.Y. FAM CT. ACT § 712(h)(v) (McKin-
ney Supp. 1979).
140. 98 Misc. 2d 994, 414 N.Y.S.2d 997 (Faro. Ct. 1979).
141. Id. at 999, 414 N.Y.S.2d at 1000.
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fact-finding established that the juvenile committed a DFA.142 In
Matter of Frederick B.,'" a DFA designation on a petition was
permitted prior to completion of the fact-finding hearing. The
court in Frederick B. construed the intent of the Family Court Act
rule against a judge examining probation material144 to exclude in-
competent, hearsay evidence of a juvenile's history in general
rather than evidence of past findings per se. In addition, the court
considered a failure to make the designation to be a denial of equal
protection by "affording an unfair advantage to respondents who
choose not to testify over those respondents who exercise their
constitutional right to testify and are subject to impeachment by
reason of prior felony findings.' 1 45 The marking of petitions as
DFA petitions at the fact-finding stage of a juvenile proceeding
continues to be done routinely in New York despite the possibility
of bias towards the juvenile. The continued use of this procedure
reflects in part the desire of the state legislature and the judiciary
to protect the community from further crimes by recidivist juve-
nile offenders.
C. The Crime Package Bill
The JJRA amendments of 1978 had not even gone into effect,
when the N.Y. legislature responding to the vicious murders com-
mitted by Bosket and other juveniles enacted the Crime Package
Bill'" in an effort to make the system more effective in dealing
with juvenile crime. The legislature sought to effectuate this goal
by making juveniles criminally responsible as adults for a large
number of violent crimes and by providing longer sentences for
juveniles convicted of such crimes. Three specific revisions enacted
as part of the Crime Package Bill will be discussed. First, the
newly-created juvenile offender ("JO") category will be analyzed.
Second, the Bill's removal procedure will be discussed. Third, the
penalties that can be imposed upon juveniles convicted of crimes
as adults will be covered.
142. See also Matter of Samuel P., 424 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Fam. Ct. 1980), rev'd, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 8, 1980, at 15 col. 5 (2d Dep't July 26, 1980).
143. 425 N.Y.S.2d 44 (Faro. Ct. 1978).
144. See text accompanying note 136 supra.
145. 425 N.Y.S.2d at 45. See also Matter of Robert D., 411 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Fain. Ct.
1978); Matter of Francis L. and Juan B., Nos. D-2701/78, D-2891/78 (Fain. Ct. Dec. 8, 1978).
146. 1978 N.Y. Laws ch. 481.
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1. The Juvenile Offender Category
A juvenile offender is a fourteen or fifteen year-old who is held
criminally responsible for any of fourteen different crimes 14 7 or a
thirteen year old who is criminally responsible for acts constituting
second degree murder. ' 8 The defense of infancy is no longer avail-
able for these crimes.149
A JO is treated as an adult when arrested. Once arrested, the
juvenile is taken by the police to the central booking facility where
he is photographed and fingerprinted. The case is then screened by
an assistant district attorney. 50 If the attorney decides that the act
allegedly committed by the juvenile does not fall within the stat-
ute, he can decline to prosecute the juvenile as a JO and refer the
case to family court. Sixteen percent of juveniles charged as JO's
are disposed of at this point.'' The district attorney can also dis-
147. These crimes are: second degree murder (including felony murder where the juve-
nile is criminally responsible for the underlying crime), first degree kidnapping, first degree
manslaughter, first and second degree arson, first degree burglary, first degree sodomy
(where force is used or the victim is incapable of consent but not where the victim is less
than eleven), second degree burglary (where the defendant is armed, causes physical injury,
uses or threatens use of a dangerous instrument or displays what appears to be a firearm),
first degree rape (or by forcible compulsion or where the victim is incapable of consent), first
degree robbery and second degree robbery (where the defendant causes physical injury or
displays what appears to be a firearm), first degree assault (where a serious physical injury
is caused by a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument or where the victim is intentionally
maimed) and attempted murder and kidnapping. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(18) (McKinney
Supp. 1979).
As originally enacted, juveniles could be charged only with crimes for which they were
criminally responsible. Thus, if an incident involved sexual abuse as well as robbery, the
indictment could not charge sexual abuse because the latter is not a juvenile offense. Recent
legislation has lessened this inconsistency by allowing inclusion of non-JO charges where the
non-JO charges are based upon "the same act or the same criminal transaction" or where
proof of one charge would be material and admissible as evidence in chief, "upon a trial of
the other." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 220.20(6). If the court subsequently dismisses the JO
charge, the other charges will be removed. Id. §§ 210.20(5), .30(7).
148. Id. A 13 year old is not criminally responsible for felony murder inasmuch as he is
not criminally responsible for any of its underlying felonies.
149. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.00(2) (McKinney 1978). See People v. Ryal, 420 N.Y.S.2d 257
(Sup. Ct. 1979).
150. STATE OF NEW YORK, DIVISION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVICES, Juvenile Offenders in
New York City: Their Characteristics and the Course of Case Processing, 4, 5 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as DCJS-NYC]. This study was done in conjunction with the New York City
Criminal Justice Agency. Although quite detailed, the study covers only the first nine
months of the law, i.e., until May 31, 1979.
151. State of New York, Division of Criminal Justice Services, Juvenile Offenders in
New York State, September 1, 1978-February 29, 1980 Table 3 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
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miss the charges if it is believed that the charges cannot be proven.
This occurs in thirteen percent of the total cases. 152 If the district.
attorney elects to prosecute, the juvenile is arraigned in a criminal
court as an adult. The criminal court judge can release the juvenile
on his own recognizance, fix bail,153 or deny bail and remand the
juvenile to the Department of Correctional Services ("DOCS") to
be held at a place designated by DFY for the reception of
children.""
After the juvenile has been arraigned, a preliminary hearing is
held to determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe the
juvenile committed a juvenile offense. 55 If no such finding is made
at the preliminary hearing, the court must dismiss the felony com-
plaint. If the court finds that there is reasonable cause to believe
the juvenile has committed a delinquent act but not a juvenile of-
fense, it must remove the proceeding to family court.' 56
2. Removal
A juvenile proceeding may be removed in criminal court, in
supreme court, by a grand jury, by a guilty plea, and at sentencing.
Following amendments enacted in 1979, a criminal court judge
must order removal to the family court at the request of the dis-
trict attorney, if upon consideration of specified criteria, it is deter-
DCJS-NYS.
152. Id.
153. See N.Y. CIv. PRAC. LAW § 500.10(2), (3), (9) (McKinney 1971) for definitions of
these terms. Criteria for granting bail are set forth in N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(2)
(McKinney 1971 and Supp. 1979). The concept of bail for juveniles is perplexing because
many of the criteria for determining whether to grant bail really 'do not apply to
juveniles. For example, in determining bail a court should consider, inter alia, the defen-
dant's employment and financial resources as well as any ties in the community. Id.
§ 510.30(2)(a)(ii),(iii).
154. Approximately 45% of juveniles arraigned are released on their own recognizance.
Bail is set for another 50% and denied for 5%. The average bail set is $2,375 with the
median being $1,000. Only 12% of those for whom bail is set are able to post it'at arraign-
ment. DCJS-NYC, supra note 150, at 14-17. Most juvenile offenders are detained only a
few days. However, 20% are held longer than six days. In fact 12 juveniles have been held in
excess of 270 days and two in excess of 450 days. DCJS-NYS, supra note 151, at Table 9.
155. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75(3)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979). If the juvenile waives
a hearing, the court must order that the juvenile be held for grand jury action. Id. §
180.75(2).
156. Id. § 180.75(3)(b). The court must specify the act or acts it found reasonable cause
to believe the juvenile committed.
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mined that removal is in the interests of justice.157 However, if the
juvenile is charged with murder, rape, sodomy or an "armed fel-
ony,' 168 a court to order removal, in addition, must also find at
least one of the following factors:
(i) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the manner in which
the crime was committed; or (ii) where the defendant was not the sole par-
ticipant in the crime, the defendant's participation was relatively minor al-
though not so minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution; or (iii)
possible deficiencies in proof of the crime.159
A juvenile can move for removal either in criminal court or in
supreme court, provided he has not waived his right to a prelimi-
nary hearing or such a hearing has not yet been held.16 0 If the juve-
nile properly makes such a motion in supreme court, that court is
authorized to sit as a criminal court and conduct a preliminary
hearing. The supreme court can, on its own or another party's mo-
tion and over the objection of the district attorney, remove any
proceeding except those involving murder, rape, sodomy or an
armed felony"'1 if the court finds it appropriate, based upon an
157. Id. § 180.75(4). The original juvenile offender statute had left the term "interests of
justice" undefined. This resulted in some challenges to the constitutionality of the law. See
People v. Williams, 97 Misc. 2d 24, 410 N.Y.S.2d 973 (County Ct. 1978). Legislation enacted
in 1979 specifically sets forth the criteria:
(a) the seriousness and circumstances of the offense; (b) the extent of harm caused by
the offense; (c) the evidence of guilt whether admissible or inadmissible at trial; (d)
the history, character and condition of the defendant; (e) the purpose and effect of
imposing upon the defendant a sentence authorized for the offense; (f) the impact of
a removal of the case to the family court on the safety or welfare of the community;
(g) the impact of a removal of the case to the family court upon the confidence of the
public in the criminal justice system; (h) where the court deems it appropriate, the
attitude of the complainant or victim with respect to the motion; and (i) any other
relevant fact indicating that a judgment of conviction in the criminal court would
serve no useful purpose.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 210.43(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
158. An "armed felony" is a "violent felony offense," which includes as an element either
"(a) possession, being armed with or causing serious physical injury by reason of a deadly
weapon if the weapon is a loaded weapon for which a shot readily capable of causing death
or serious injury may be discharged or (b) display of what appears to be a pistol, revolver,
rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm." N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 1.20(41) (McKinney
1972). For a definition of what constitutes a violent felony offense see N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.02(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
159. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 180.75(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979); See People v. Williams,
97 Misc. 2d 24, 410 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
160. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 180.75(5) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
161. This refers to an armed felony involving possession of a loaded firearm rather than
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"interests of justice" analysis.'6 This is the only instance where
removal is possible in supreme court over the district attorney's
objection.163 If the supreme court finds that murder, rape, sodomy
or an armed felony 164 is involved, it can remove only with the con-
sent of the district attorney and after undertaking the three-factor
analysis.' Removal over the district attorney's objection is never
possible in criminal court.1a6 Of those juveniles who are arrested
for juvenile offenses, thirty-five percent are removed to family
court with another thirteen percent being dismissed by the crimi-
nal court.' 67
Approximately one-third of the juveniles whose cases are not
disposed of in criminal court are referred to the grand jury.16 8 A
grand jury has three alternatives as to the disposition of the juve-
nile. First, a grand jury can indict the juvenile for the crimes for
which he is charged. Second, the grand jury can dismiss the
charges if there is insufficient proof of the commission of a crime.
Third, a grand jury could find that a crime has been committed
but not one for which a juvenile is criminally responsible. If the
latter conclusion is reached, the grand jury can file a request to
remove the proceeding to a family court. 16' If a grand jury does not
indict within thirty days of the juvenile's initial confinement, the
juvenile must be released on his own recognizance.17 0 Grand jury
removal is surprisingly common. In the first nine months following
the enactment of the Crime Package Bill, grand juries dismissed
five percent of the cases referred to them and removed another
involving mere display of what appears to be a firearm. See note 158 supra.
162. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 180.75(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
163. Id. § 210.43(1). See People v. Putland, 423 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005-06 (County Ct.
1979).
164. See note 161 supra.
165. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
166. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 180.75(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
167. DCJS-NYS, supra note 151, at Table 3.
168. Id. See N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 190.71 (McKinney Supp. 1979); People v. Mason,
99 Misc. 2d 583, 416 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1979); People v. Williams, 100 Misc. 2d 183, 418
N.Y.S.2d 737 (County Ct. 1979).
169. N.Y. CRIM. PROc. LAW § 190.71 (McKinney Supp. 1979). When the case is removed
by the criminal court, the grand jury loses its power to indict, even if the charges are pend-
ing before the grand jury at the time of removal. Rodriguez v. Myerson, 69 A.D.2d 162, 170,
418 N.Y.S.2d 936, 941 (2d Dep't 1979).
170. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 190.80 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Adults can be held for 45
days.
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sixteen percent."'
In Vega v. Bell,'72 the New York Court of Appeals, in its first
ruling on the juvenile offender law, held that a juvenile has neither
a statutory nor a constitutional right to a hearing before indict-
ment by a grand jury as to whether the interests of justice require
removal of the proceeding.1 73
After Vega, the legislature amended the juvenile offender law to
specifically provide for removal hearings in supreme court.17"4
These hearings can either be held while the case is pending in
criminal court 75 or after indictment, provided that the juvenile
has not previously been denied a motion for removal.7 6 The proce-
dure and criteria for post-indictment removal are the same as the
procedure and criteria for pre-indictment removal. In either in-
stance the court can hold a hearing to determine whether the evi-
dence indicates that a crime has been committed for which consent
of the district attorney is necessary in order to grant removal.
7 7
Removal can also occur in the supreme court after a plea has
been entered. When a fourteen or fifteen year-old charged with a
crime other than murder 78 enters a guilty plea, the district attor-
ney may recommend removal of the proceeding to family court. If
a district attorney chooses to make such a recommendation, a
memorandum must be submitted outlining how the "interests of
justice" would best be served by removal to family court. In addi-
tion, if the juvenile is charged with first degree rape or sodomy, or
an armed felony not involving mere display of a firearm, or, in the
171. DCJS-NYC, supra note 150, at 26.
172. 47 N.Y.2d 543, 393 N.E.2d 450, 419 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1979).
173. Id. at 552-53, 393 N.E.2d at 455-56, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 460. The court distinguished
Kent on the ground that the statutory scheme in Kent involved a waiver of juvenile court
jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court, whereas the New York statute imposed the adult
system on all youngsters over a certain age who were accused of specified criminal activities
unless special circumstances warranted transfer to family court. Id. at 550-51, 393 N.E.2d at
454-55, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 459. See also People v. Ryals, 420 N.Y.S.2d 257, 261 (Sup. Ct.
1979).
174. N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAW § 180.75(5) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
175. See text accompanying note 160 supra.
176. N.Y. CiM. PRoc. LAW §§ 180.75(5),(6)(d), 210.43 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
177. Id. See text accompanying notes 160-67 supra.
178. The statute provides that a fourteen or fifteen year-old charged with second degree
murder can enter a guilty plea only to a crime for which he is criminally responsible. Re-
moval is not possible in this circumstance. N.Y. CaM. PRoc. LAW § 220.10(g)(i) (McKinney
Supp. 1979).
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alternative, if a thirteen year-old is charged with second degree
murder, the district attorney must establish: that mitigating cir-
cumstances exist; or that the juvenile was a minor participant in
the criminal acts; or that there are deficiencies in the proof against
the juvenile;1 7 9 or "where the juvenile offender has no previous ad-
judications of having committed a designated felony act, . . .re-
gardless of the age of the offender at the time of the commission of
the act, that the criminal act was not part of a pattern of criminal
behavior and, in view of the history of the offender, is not likely to
be repeated."180 If the court determines, based upon the district
attorney's memorandum, that the interests of justice would best be
served by removal, a plea of guilty for a crime or act for which the
juvenile is not criminally responsible may be entered, 81 except
that a thirteen year-old charged with second degree murder may
only plead to a DFA.' 8' The court must then remove the action to
family court upon acceptance of such a plea.'88
If a juvenile's case progresses through the system without being
removed from criminal court, from supreme court, by a grand jury,
or at sentencing, it will proceed to a jury trial in the same manner
as any adult case. Nevertheless, the juvenile has two additional op-
portunities for removal to family court. If a jury convicts a juvenile
of a crime for which he is not criminally responsible,'" the crimi-
nal court must order the verdict vacated and replaced by a juvenile
delinquency fact determination. 85 If a jury verdict is vacated, the
court must remove the proceeding to family court.'" e
179. See text accompanying note 159 supra.
180. N.Y. CraiM. PRoc. LAW § 220.10(g)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
181. If the indictment does not charge a juvenile with second degree murder, and a plea
of guilty is not accepted, then any plea of guilty must be for a crime for which the juvenile is
criminally responsible. Id. § 220.10(5)(g)(ii).
182. This situation arose because thirteen year-olds are only criminally responsible for
murder and under the old statute could plead guilty only to murder. Id. § 220.10(5)(h) (Mc-
Kinney Supp. 1978) (amended 1979). The former provision gave defense counsel little incen-
tive to plea bargain.
183. Id. § 220.10(5)(g)(iii) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
184. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 330.50 (McKinney 1971) requires the court to instruct the
jury with respect to such lesser included charges.
185. Id. § 310.85(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
186. Id. § 310.85(2). If a verdict of guilty is also rendered with respect to a crime for
which the juvenile is criminally responsible, or if the juvenile is awaiting sentence or is
under a sentence of imprisonment on another criminal conviction, the verdict for the crime
for which he is not criminally responsible must be set aside and deemed a nullity.
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In addition, if the juvenile is convicted of a crime for which he is
found to be criminally responsible, other than second degree mur-
der, the action may be removed upon motion by the juvenile, and
with the consent of the district attorney.1 87 A memorandum must
be submitted in support of such a motion, outlining the circum-
stances which justify removal.1 88
Regardless of the stage at which a case is removed to family
court, an order of removal must direct that all of the pleadings and
proceedings in an action be transferred to the family court.18' The
minutes of any hearings in supreme or criminal court or before a
grand jury are incorporated into the pleadings before the family
court.190 After removal, a juvenile is arraigned in family court and
a trial date is determined. If the juvenile did not receive a probable
cause hearing in criminal court, one can be held in family court.'s'
3. Sentencing
The foremost concern of a convicted juvenile offender is the sen-
tence he will receive for the crimes he has committed. The juvenile
offender law theoretically provides for harsher penalties than those
imposed in family court but not as harsh as those imposed on
187; Id. § 330.25(1).
188. These factors include: (1) mitigating circumstances that bear directly upon the
manner in which the crime was committed; or (2) where the defendant was not the sole
participant in the crime, the defendant's participation was relatively minor although not so
minor as to constitute a defense to the prosecution; or (3) where the juvenile offender has no
previous adjudications of having committed a designated felony act, . . . regardless of the
age of the offender at the time of the commission of the act, that the criminal act was not
part of a pattern of criminal behavior and, in view of the history.of the offender, is not likely
to be repeated. Id.
189. Id. § 725.05(8).
190. Id.
191. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 739(c) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
1980]1.
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adults. 192 The New York Penal Law mandates that the sentencing
court shall impose an indeterminate sentence19 for a felony com-
mitted by a juvenile offender." 4 In addition, restrictions are placed
upon the imposition of consecutive sentences for juvenile offenders
with more than one conviction.18
A convicted juvenile offender, after sentencing, is initially placed
in a secure DFY facility"' where he remains until he is twenty-one
years old," 7 unless his sentence expires earlier. A convicted JO is
192.
ADULT JO DFA
CRIME PENALTY* PENALTY PENALTY
Murder 2 A-i Felony 5-9 to life 5 yr. restrictive placement
15-25 to life
Arson 1, Kidnapping A-1 Felony 4-6 to 12-15 yrs. 5 yr. restrictive placement
15-25 to life
Rape 1, Robbery 1, Class B Felony 1/3 of max. to 3 yr. restrictive placement
Sodomy 1, Manslaughter 1, up to 1/3 of max. to 10 yrs.
Burglary 1 25 yrs.
Burglary 2, Robbery 2, Class C Felony 1/3 of max. to 7 3 yr. restrictive placement
Assault 1 up to 1/3 of max. to yrs.
15 yrs.
Adult penalties may vary somewhat because certain conditions may mandate longer sentences.
See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 70.05 (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1979); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT.
§ 753-a(2-a),(3),(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
193. An indeterminate sentence is a sentence with both a maximum and minimum term.
194. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979). The class A felony of second
degree murder carries a minimum of five to nine years with a maximum of life. The class A
felonies of first degree arson and first degree kidnapping carry minimum sentences of four
to six years and maximums of 12-15 years. For a class B felony, the minimum is one-third of
the maximum term imposed; the maximum is ten years. Class C felonies also carry a mini-
mum of one-third of the maximum term imposed; the maximum is seven years. Id.
§ 70.05(2),(3).
195. If the juvenile is not convicted of a class A felony, two consecutive sentences may
not exceed a total of ten years. If the juvenile is convicted of a class A felony kidnapping or
arson, the total aggregate may not exceed 15 years. Id. at § 70.30(1)(d).
196. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.05(4) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Prior to 1976, a juvenile con-
victed of a class A or B felony could have been sent to an adult prison. See text accompany-
ing notes 90-93 supra.
197. N.Y. EXEc. LAW § 515-b(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979). It should be noted that a juve-
nile will receive credit against his minimum sentence for any time spent in custody prior to
sentencing. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.30(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979). As well as good behavior
time up to one third of his maximum sentence. Id. § 70.30(4).
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placed in the same type of facility as he would have been if the
juvenile had been convicted of a DFA. After the juvenile's twenty-
first birthday, he is placed with the Department of Correctional
Services ("DOCS") to complete his term in an adult facility. 198
A juvenile can also be transferred by DFY to DOCS before he
reaches his twenty-first birthday. The procedure for transfer de-
pends upon the age of the juvenile. If the juvenile is between the
ages of sixteen and eighteen, DFY may apply to the sentencing
court for transfer to DOCS if the juvenile is not likely to benefit
from the progress offered by the DFY facilities. A possible due
process violation is averted by the provision that "[s]uch applica-
tion shall be made upon notice to the youth, who shall be entitled
to be heard upon the application and to be represented by counsel
or law guardian."" If the juvenile is between eighteen and twenty-
one years of age, DFY may effect a transfer simply by certifying to
DOCS that the juvenile is not likely to benefit from DFY.2 00 The
only difference between juvenile offenders confined in DFY's se-
cure facilities and juveniles confined there because of convictions
for DFA's is that the former serve their entire sentence at the se-
cure facility rather than being transferred to a residential facility
at the end of a year or eighteen months. It is also apparent that,
given the range of sentences presently imposed upon JO's, most
JO's will complete their sentences in a DFY facility without ever
being transferred to an adult prison. 0 1
The juvenile offender law, as enacted in 1978, specifically pre-
cluded a court from utilizing non-jail sentencing alternatives such
as probation, fines, and conditional and unconditional discharges.
It also prohibited giving youthful offender treatment to a juve-
nile. 02 Youthful offender ("YO") treatment is ordinarily available
198. Id. § 515-b(6).
199. Id. § 515-b(4).
200. Id. § 515-b(5). This section of the Executive Law has yet to be challenged on due
process or equal protection grounds, most likely because the distinction between those
juveniles who are older than eighteen and those who are younger bears reasonable relation
to the varying objectives of the juvenile justice system.
201. The disparity in treatment of JO's and juveniles convicted of DFA's does not neces-
sarily raise a viable constitutional question of equal protection so long as the disparity is
reasonable in relation to permissible statutory goals. As of June 1980, only one juvenile in
the entire state has been transferred to DOCS.
202. N.Y. P.NAJL LAW § 60.10 (McKinney 1971) (amended 1979). The denial of YO treat-
ment was attacked in several cases as unconstitutional, with mixed results. See People v.
1980]
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to any person over sixteen and under nineteen years of age, unless
the youth is convicted of a class A-i or A-II felony, has previously
been convicted and sentenced either for a felony or adjudicated a
youthful offender following conviction for a felony, and has not
been found to have previously committed a DFA.'03 A YO adjudi-
cation is not a record of conviction of a crime.204 Most significantly,
the maximum sentence upon a YO adjudication is an indetermi-
nate term of four years.20 5
The denial of YO treatment for a juvenile offender led to the
anomalous situation where a convicted eighteen year-old was being
treated less harshly than his equally culpable fourteen year-old ac-
complice .2" The New York legislature remedied this in 1979 by
authorizing a court to grant YO treatment if it finds that the inter-
ests of justice would be served.10 7 In addition, the non-jail sentenc-
ing alternatives mentioned above are currently available.208 There-
fore, it appears that, by allowing courts to utilize probation, fines
and discharges, the legislature has returned, albeit in a limited
fashion, to some of the rehabilitative ideals espoused by the nine-
teenth century reformers.
IV. Analysis of New York's Juvenile Offender Law
Serious constitutional and statutory problems were created by
the Juvenile Offender Law of 1978 with which courts are still
struggling. These include whether JO proceedings in criminal and
Michael D., 99 Misc. 2d 816, 417 N.Y.S.2d 604 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (statute held unconstitu-
tional); People v. Mason, 99 Misc. 2d 583, 416 N.Y.S.2d 981 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (statute up-
held); People v. Bates, N.Y.L.J. June 1, 1979 at 13, col. 1 (statute upheld).
.203. N.Y. CiuM. PRoc. LAw § 720.10(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
204. Id. § 720.35(1) (McKinney 1971). Records and papers relating to YO proceedings
are confidential. Id. § 720.35(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
205. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.02, 70.00(2)(e) (McKinney 1975 and Supp. 1979).
206. This situation has been held to violate the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See People v. Michael D., 99 Misc. 2d 816, 417 N.Y.S.2d 604, 606-08 (Sup. Ct.
1979).
207. N.Y. CrIM. PROC. LAW § 720.20(1) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
208. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.02(2), 60.10(2) (McKinney Supp. 1979). Allowing juvenile
offenders to receive YO treatment alleviates a great inequity, see text accompanying note
206 supra, but also undermines the purpose of trying the juvenile in supreme court. The
sentence imposed in supreme court is likely to be less severe than that which would have
been imposed in family court. Moreover, the juvenile's record is not marred by a predicate
felony conviction.
[Vol. IX
19801 JUVENILE OFFENDER LAW
supreme court should be open to the press and public209 and
whether the major delegation of authority to the district attorney
regarding the issue of removal is an encroachment on the separa-
tion of powers.2 10 Two problems will be briefly discussed here.
First, the DFA and JO concepts will be analyzed. Second, the juve-
nile removal process will be examined. This section will conclude
with a statistical analysis of the juvenile offender law.
Perhaps the most serious problem plaguing New York's present
juvenile justice system is the very foundation upon which it is
built, namely, the DFA and JO concepts. The system attempts to
differentiate criminal behavior according to the definitional catego-
ries set forth in the Penal Law. Unfortunately, there are many hei-
nous acts which depending upon the factual circumstances fail to
fall within the ambit of either the DFA or the JO categories, such
as attempted rape and attempted robbery and ironically, many less
serious acts which do. Only when the system reclassifies the vari-
ous degrees of criminal acts will it be capable of effectively punish-
ing the worst juvenile criminals.
The current removal procedures in New York must be character-
209. Members of the press and the public may be barred from family court proceedings
in New York. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 741(b) (McKinney 1975). In contrast, proceedings in
criminal and supreme court are open to both the press and the public. In People v. Green,
N.Y.L.J. October 16, 1978, at 16, cols. 2-4, a juvenile whose case was pending in criminal
court sought to have all hearings closed to the press and public because the proceeding
might ultimately be removed to family court. The court, in denying the juvenile's applica-
tion, held that the public's right to know and to assess the utility of the Crime Package Bill
outweighed the juvenile's right to a closed proceeding.
In Merola v. Bell, 68 A.D.2d 24, 415 N.Y.S.2d 992 (1st Dep't 1979), a thirteen year-old
charged with murder was successful in barring press and public from a suppression hearing.
The First Department, in sustaining the trial court's closure order, stated that the adverse
publicity which would be generated by the press would seriously impair the juvenile's con-
stitutional right to a trial by impartial jurors. 68 A.D.2d at 24, 415 N.Y.S.2d at 994-95. The
New York Court of Appeals upheld the closure order. Merola v. Bell, 47 N.Y.2d 965, 393
N.E.2d 1038, 419 N.Y.S.2d 965 (1979), appeal pending. See Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePas-
quale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979) (closure order in pretrial proceeding upheld on Sixth Amendment
grounds).
The Supreme Court cut back on Gannett in Richmond Newspapers, Inc., v. Virginia, 444
U.S. 896 (1980). There, the Court stated that while there is not a sixth amendment right of
access to a trial, there is a first amendment right of access to criminal trials in the absence
of extraordinary circumstances. After Richmond Newspapers, a motion to close a juvenile's
trial will probably fail for the trial itself as opposed to pre and post-trial proceedings.
210. One court has held that vesting the'district attorney with power to withhold con-
sent to removal does not violate this constitutional doctrine. People v. Putland, 423
N.Y.S.2d 999 (County Ct. 1979).
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ized as inadequate and inefficient. The present procedures require
police, prosecutors, defense attorneys and complainants to expend
time and resources unnecessarily. It is common for a juvenile to go
through three or four court appearances in the adult system before
his case is removed to family court. Witnesses may be required to
appear in court several times. When the case is removed to family
court, the juvenile is usually assigned a new attorney who is in
most instances unfamiliar with the prior proceedings.
Another problem with the removal procedure is the method in
which it is effected. Assistant district attorneys and criminal court
judges are frequently unfamiliar with the range of dispositions and
types of placement available in family court and thus make their
decisions regarding removal in a vacuum. Moreover, the removal
decision is often based on a case's relative strengths rather than on
its merits. The statute lists "possible deficiencies in proof of the
crime" as one of the grounds for removal. 1' Thus, removal is fre-
quently used as a device to transfer potentially "weak" cases to
family court. The family court judge, however, must apply the
same rules of evidence and standards of proof as are applied in
supreme court.212 A "weak case" is rarely strengthened by being
declared "possibly deficient in proof" and removed to family court.
When the allegations are serious and the juvenile's record merits
adult treatment, the case should remain in the adult system re-
gardless of any possible deficiencies in proof.
In view of the fact that the minutes of a removal hearing are
incorporated into. the pleadings in family court,2 1 8 a juvenile's case
cannot proceed without them. Unfortunately, it frequently takes as
long as two months to procure these minutes, during which time a
serious case stands untried. When the minutes do arrive, addi-
tional problems are created in that the judge, serving as the finder
of fact, has before him all the prior testimony taken at the removal
hearing, regardless of whether either counsel wishes to elicit that
testimony at the fact-finding hearing. This problem is particularly
evident where the minutes not only include the testimony of wit-
nesses who failed to testify at the fact-finding hearing despite their
211. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
212. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 744 (McKinney 1975).
213. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 725.05(8) (McKinney Supp. 1979); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 731(3) (McKinney Supp. 1979).
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availability to do so, but also include references to the juvenile's
past record which the fact-finding court would ordinarily not be
privy to at that point. " ' As part of the pleadings the removal hear-
ing is not in evidence as such, what weight this testimony should
be accorded at the fact-finding is unclear.
While not a clear violation of a juvenile's constitutional rights,
this provision violates the spirit of the requirement that the wide
range of hearsay material contained in the juvenile's probation file
not be considered at a fact-finding hearing.215 This provision places
an unnecessary burden on a trial judge, forcing him to separate
prior testimony he had read from testimony he has heard.216
V. Statistical Analysis of the Juvenile Offender Law
The ultimate question in assessing New York's juvenile offender
law is whether it operates to distill from those who pass through
the system the worst juvenile criminals and whether it effectively
punishes them. Unfortunately, statistics reveal that the juvenile of-
fender system is not only awkward and inefficient but in many
ways counterproductive. A study of the first eighteen months since
the enactment of the juvenile offender law reveals that, during this
214. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 750 (McKinney Supp. 1979).
215. See note 136 supra and accompanying text.
216. See generally Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 86 (1970); United States v. King, 613
F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1980); and unavailability, United States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936, 939 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting); United States v.
Gonzalez, 559 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1977) (grand jury testimony held inadmissible); United
States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1977); People ex rel. Lauring v. Mucci, 44 A.D.2d 479,
480, 355 N.Y.S.2d 786, 787 (1st Dep't 1974). See also FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(5); United States
v. Martin, 615 F.2d 318, 326 (5th Cir. 1980); Furtado v. Bishop, 604 F.2d 80, 91 (1st Cir.
1979).
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period, there were 2,432 JO arrests statewide,"'7 86% of which
were made in New York City. Of the 2,089 JO arrests made in New
York City, the various district attorneys declined to prosecute 16%
as JO's, referring them instead to family court, 18 dismissed 13%
and removed 35% to family court. 23% of the total arrests re-
217. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
STATEWIDE ARRESTS BY CHARGE
September 1, 1978-February 29, 1980
SUBURBAN UPSTATE NEW YORK CITY STATEWIDE
Robbery 1 57(36) 70(38) 974(46) 1101(45)
Robbery 2 37(23) 42(23) 629(30) 708(29)
Assault 1 5(3) 11(6) 88(4) 104(4)
Burglary 1 7(4) 3(2) 27(1) 37(2)
Burglary 2 17(11) 13(7) 29(1) 59(2)
Arson I & 2 7(4) 12(6) 44(2) 63(3)
Rape 1 14(9) 12(6) 131(6) 157(6)
Sodomy 1 6(4) 11(6) 43(2) 60(2)
Kidnapping 1 & 2 1(1) 4(0) 5(0)
Att. Murder 2 2(1) 1(1) 57(3) 60(2)
Murder 2* 4(3) 9(5) 44(2) 57(2)
Other 2(1) 4(0) 6(0)
Unknown 25(1) 25(1)
158(100) 185(100) 2089(100) 2432(100)
* Includes Manslaughter.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
DCJS-NYS, supra note 151, at Table 2, 11.
218. This occurs when it is believed that the alleged crime is not one for which a juvenile
is criminally responsible.
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suited in indictment. The remaining 10% were still pending in ei-
ther the grand jury or criminal court when the study was con-
cluded. 19 Of the 493 cases which resulted in indictments, 278 had
been resolved in supreme court by the end of the eighteen months;
63% resulted in convictions, usually by guilty pleas; 25% were re-
moved from supreme court because of non-JO findings or for other
reasons; and in 12% of the cases, the juvenile was acquitted or the
219. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
COURT ACTION BY COUNTY
ALL CASES
September 1, 1978-February 29, 1980
KINGS BRONX NEW YORK QUEENS RICHMOND CITYWIDE
Declined
to
Prosecute 134 (17) 81(20) 85 (18) 26 (7) 1(2) 327 (16)
Removed
to
Family Ct. 342 (43) 171 (42) 108 (21) 104 (27) 19 (46) 744 (35)
Dismissed 78 (10) 34 (8) 83 (18) 74 (19) 3 (7) 272 (13)
Subtotal 554 (69) 286 (70) 276 (60) 204 (53) 23 (56) 1343 (64)
Pend. in
Crim. Ct. 62 (8) 15 (4) 42 (9) 22 (6) 2 (5) 143 (7)
Pend. in
Grand Jury 31 (4) 2 (0) 3 (1) .20 (5) 1 (2) 57 (3)
Indicted 154 (19) 98 (24) 93 (20) 132 (34) 15 (37) 492 (23)
Subtotal 247 (31) 115 (28) 138 (30) 174 (45) 18 (44) 692 (33)
Unconfirmed
arres reports 1 (0) 9 (2) 47 (10) 6 (2) 63 (3)
Total 802 (100) 410 (100) 461 (100) 384 (100) 41 (100) 2098 (100)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
DCJS-NYS, supra note 151, at Table 3.
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proceeding was dismissed.2
The sentencing figures for this period emphasize the impact that
the juvenile offender law has had upon the justice system. In New
York City, only 108 juveniles were sentenced as JO's. 31% of the
JO's did not receive a jail sentence but rather received a five-year
probation term. Eight percent received four-year youthful offender
sentences, while 26% received a three-year maximum sentence. In
essence, at least 57% of those juveniles sentenced during this pe-
220. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
DISPOSITIONS OF INDICTED CASES
September 1, 1978--February 29, 1980
KINGS BRONX NEW YORK QUEENS RICHMOND CITYWIDE
Guilty By
Trial 3 (2) 2 (2) 4 (4) 4 (3) 2 (13) 15 (3)
Guilty By
Admission 41(27) 54 (55) 32 (34) 29 (22) 5 (33) 161 (33)
Total
Convictions 44 (29) 56 (57) 36 (39) 33 (25) 7 (47) 176 (36)
Removed With
Non-J.O.
Finding 1 (1) 14 (14) 8 (9) 40 (30) - 63 (13)
Removed By
Supreme Ct. 2 (1) - 2 (2) 3 (2) 7 (1)
Total
Removals 3 (2) 14 (14) 10 (11) 43 (33) - 70 (14)
Acquitted 2 (1) 3 (3) - 2 (2) 2 (13) 9 (2)
Dismissed 9 (6) 2 (2) 5 (5) 7 (5) - 23 (5)
Subtotal 11 (7) 5 (5) 5 (5) 9 (7) 2 (13) 32 (7)
Pending In
Supreme Ct. 96 (62) 23 (23) 42 (45) 47 (36) 6 (40) 214 (43)
Total
Indictments 154 (100) 98 (100) 93 (100) 132 (100) 15 (100) 492 (100)
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
Id. at Table 7. Percentages in text are percentages of the cases which as of February 29,
1980 had been resolved.
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riod received the same treatment that would have been afforded
them in family court. Only 43% received sentences which, if fully
served, would be longer than the three-year restrictive placement
for a DFA2 1 These sentences were served for the most part in
DFY facilities and not in adult correctional facilities.
221. JUVENILE OFFENDERS
SENTENCES BY COUNTY
September 1, 1978-February 29, 1980
KINGS BRONX NEW YORK QUEENS RICHMOND CITYWIDE
5 Yrs.
Probation 11(25) 7(13) 8(22) 8(24) - 34(19)
4 Yrs. - 7(13) - 2(6) - 9(5)
Y.O.
Subtotal 11(25) 14(26) 8(22) 10(30) 1 - 43(24)
3 Yrs. 13(30) 6(11) 2(6) 7(21) - 28(16)
4 Yrs. - 2(4) - - - 2(4)
5 Yrs. 1(2) 7(13) 2(6) 1(3) - 11(6)
6 Yrs. - 2(4) 2(6) 4(12) - 8(5)
7 Yrs. 1(2) 4(7) - - - 5(9)
8 Yrs. - .....
9 Yrs. - 5(9) 1(3) - - 6(12)
10 Yrs. 1(2) 1(2) 1(3) - - 3(7)
Life 1(2) - 1(3) - 2(5)
Total
Convictions 44(100) 56(100) 36(100) 33(100) 7(100) 176(100)
Note: All sentences indicated are maximums. For juvenile offenders, the minimum sen-
tence is 1/3 the maximum, except when the conviction is for murder; then, the minimum
sentence can range from five to nine years.
Note: Numbers in parentheses are percentages.
Id. at Table 8. Percentages in text represent percentage sof those cases which as of February
29, 1980 had been resolved.
J.O.
Subtotal
Pending
Sentencing
S17(38) 27(48)
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Sentencing data on juvenile offenders sentenced to DFY from
September 1, 1978 until June 13, 1980122 reveals that 36% of those
in DFY custody were sentenced to a maximum term of three years
or less. Another 26% were sentenced to a four-year maximum. 62
percent are serving sentences from which they can expect to be
conditionally released within 36 months. Only 17% of those sen-
tenced received minimum sentences of three, years or more.
Sentences imposed for the same crime appear to vary
significantly. 2
222. The Statistics and Survey Unit of DFY prepared a roster of all the juveniles sen-
tenced to DFY as JO's during this 21-month period. Before being made available, the roster
was edited to exclude the name and other identifying data of the juvenile involved. How-
ever, it does include the juvenile's date of sentence, the maximum and minimum sentence
received, the facility to which he was sent, the amount of jail time he had served prior to
sentence, and the crimes for which he was sentenced. The roster also includes the date of
eligibility for parole as well as the conditional release date, which is the date upon which the
juvenile would ordinarily be released.
Sentence (Yrs.)
Average
Period Before
Parole Eligibility
(Months)
Average Period
Before
Conditional
Release Date
(Months)
Number
of Juveniles
Sentenced
Percentage of
Juveniles
in DFY Custody
C',)
0-I - 8 1 .07
0-3 17 21 11 8
0-4 15 28 21 16
1-3 .13 21 36 27
1-4 17 30 14 10
1-5 20 37 4 3
1-6 18 30 2 1
2-5 n.a. n.a. 2 1
2-6 19 43 11 8
2-7 21 47 9 7
3-8 n.a. n.a. 1 .7
3-9 29 65 8 6
3-10 36 74 11 8
5 to life 53 n.a. 2 1
7 to life n.a. n.a. 1 .7
9 to life 99 n.a. 1 .7
Totals - I - 135 100
DCJS-NYS, supra note 151, at Table 2-5. See also EXECUTIVE ADVISORY COMMITTnE ON
SENTENCING, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN NEW YORK: AN INQUIRY INTO SENTENCING AND THE
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Those juveniles whose cases were removed to family court 2'4 do
not appear to have been treated in a particularly harsh manner. In
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM X-xxi (Report to Governor Hugh L. Carey, March 1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited as ExEcUTrz COMMISSON ON SENTENCING]. Fractional sentences have been aver-
aged out.
224. The majority of removals are robbery cases, with assault and rape charges also be-
ing frequently removed.
Distribution of Arrest Charges for Family Court Cases
Supreme Court
For:
Removed Criminal Grand Fact Disposition
From or By: Court Jury Finding (Sentence) Total
Robbery 1 141 39% 7 23% 4 66% 9 30% 161 37%
Robbery 2 153 42 10 32 1 17 13 43 177 41
Rape 1 27 7 2 6 1 17 - - 30 7
Assault 1 11 3 5 16 -- 2 7 18 4
Arson 2 11 3 1 3 2 7 14 3
Sodomy 1 11 3 2 6 - - 13 3
Burglary 1 6 2 - - 1 3 7 2
Murder 2 1 1 3 2 7 5 1
Att. Murder I * 3 10 1 3 5 1
Burglary 2 1 1
Kidnapping I * 1 
Totals 365 100% 31 100% 6 100% 30 100% 432 100%
DCJS-NYC, supra note 150, at 35.
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28% of the removals,"" the charges were reduced, sometimes all
the way to the misdemeanor level and, in other cases, to non-DFA
felonies."
The inefficiencies of the removal process,27 which requires nu-
merous appearances by complainants and other witnesses, .are re-
flected in the conviction rate. Only 47%28 of the removed cases
result in convictions. 63% of those cases where a juvenile had been
indicted resulted in conviction,'" while 56% of all felony charges
against adults resulted in convictions." 0 Considering the gravity of
the charges and the fact that the removed cases have already been
screened at least once to eliminate the cases which cannot be suc-
cessfully prosecuted, one would expect the conviction rate to be
higher. Those proceedings which do result in convictions do not
necessarily result in DFA convictions. A substantial number result
in convictions for misdemeanors or non-DFA felonies."81 Of the re-
225. Proportion of Arrest Charges Reduced Before Removal to Family
by Most Severe Arrest Charge
Removal Charge Removal Charge
Most Severe Same as Lower Than Proportion of
Arrest Charge Arrest Charge Arrest Charge Total Charges Reduced
Robbery 1 116 45 161 28";
Robbery 2 134 43 177 24
Rape 17 12 29 41
Att. Murder 1 4 5 80
Murder 0 5 5 100
Sodomy 11 0 11 0
Assault 1 12 6 18 33
Arson 2 10 4 14 29
Burglary 1 3 3 6 50
Burglary 2 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 0
Kidnapping 1 0 1 0
Subtotal 306 122 428 29
Removal Charge N. A.
Total - - 432 -
Id. at 36.
226. Id. at 35-37.
227. See text accompanying notes 210-11 supra.
228. DCJS-NYC, supra note 150, at 41-42.
229. See note 220 supra and accompanying text.
230. See note 64 supra.
231. DCJS-NYC, supra note 150, at 43-44. The study merely specifies the crimes for
which the juvenile was convicted. Absent more information, it is difficult to ascertain
whether the convictions were for felonies, misdemeanors or DFA's. Nevertheless, out of 309
convictions, at least 32 were clearly misdemeanors. Another 77 were clearly non-DFA
felonies.
1980] JUVENILE OFFENDER LAW
maining cases, one quarter are dismissed, 16% are granted ACD's
and 10% are withdrawn, apparently because of a determination
subsequent to removal that the juvenile was at least sixteen at the
time of the alleged act."2
The dispositions made in the cases of convicted juveniles did not
reflect the severity of the original charges. 48% of the juveniles
were sentenced to probation for either one or two years, and 12%
received either a suspended sentence or an ACD. Only 40% of the
convictions resulted in placements, with 22% of those being in se-
232. Family Court Fact Findings By Type of Removal
Criminal Grand Supreme
Court Jury Court Total
Admitted 133 46'. 12 57" 3 60% 148 47
Dismissed 79 27 2 9 - - 81 25
ACD 45 15 5 24 1 20 51 16
Withdrawn 31 11 1 5 - - 32 10
Transferred 4 1 1 5 1 20 6 2
Subtotal 292 100". 21 100' 5 1001 318 100
Pending
Fact Finding 67 10 1 78
Removed After
Plea in Supreme
Court - - 30 30
Case Status Not
Available ' 6 - - 6
TOTAL FAMILY COURT 365 31 36 432
DCJS-NYC, supra note 150, at 41-43.
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cure settings.2s8 Almost 90% of the placements were made for an
initial period of 18 months or less. 84
One glaring fact emerges from these statistics: twenty-one
months following the law's passage, only 60 juvenile offenders in
the entire state received sentences imposed in the adult system
which, if fully served, would be longer than those sentences which
could have been imposed in family court. Moreover, only 48 juve-
nile offenders are likely to serve sentences longer than the family
court three-year restrictive placement. Less than 10 juveniles will
not be eligible for parole within three years.
VI. Conclusion
Although it is possible that the current system will eventually
function more smoothly once bench and bar become more familiar
233. Family Court Disposition (Sentence) Types by Type of Removal
Supreme Court Removal
For Family Court
Criminal Grand Fact Disposition
Court Jury Finding (Sentence) Total
Placement
Non-Secure 15 15% 2 20% - 2 10I. 19 15%
Secure 18 18 3 30 - 7 35 28 22
Not Available 4 4 - - - - 4 3
Subtotal 37 37 5 50 - 9 45 51 40
Probation 50 51 5 50 - 7 35 62 48
Dismissed/ACD 6 6 -- 4 20 10 8
Suspended
Judgment 6 - - - 6 4
Total 99 100. 10 100% - 20 100% 129 100%
Type Not
Available 6 2 - 8
Total Disposed
(Sentenced) 105 12 - 20 137
Id. at 44-46.
234. Id. at 47-48. The data is somewhat sparse because the length of placement is known
for only 39 juveniles. However, 31 of those juveniles were placed for 18 months or less. This
percentage is so overwhelming as to make it unlikely that a larger sample would result in
radically different figures. This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that only 19 restrictive
placements were made in New York in 1979. See A Roster edited to exclude the names of
JUVENILE OFFENDER LAW
with the various procedures, the juvenile justice system will never
operate at peak efficiency unless it is flexible enough to handle
both a Willie Bosket and a graffiti artist. The choice is between
reviving the present, cumbersome system by periodic reforms and
creating a new, more efficient juvenile justice system. Although the
latter method is obviously preferred, the former must nonetheless
be considered.
A major problem troubling the juvenile justice system is inade-
quate state and local financial assistance. As a result, the entire
juvenile system is understaffed. Probation officers routinely strug-
gle with case loads too great to enable them to provide individual
attention to juveniles. Congested court calendars often force two-
month adjournments of fact-finding hearings.
Inadequate funding has had its strongest impact upon DFY.
DFY has only 174 beds in secure facilities in the state.3 5 As of
June 13, 1980, there were 103 juvenile offenders in secure facili-
ties23s and 143 juveniles with restrictive placements.2 3 7 As a result,
40 to 50 juveniles at any given time are in detention centers await-
ing transfer to secure facilities. Some juveniles remain in detention
so long that the minimum period of the juvenile's sentence expires
before he or she is sent to a DFY facility.238One means to insure that the system will become more efficient
is to consolidate the prosecutorial function. Retaining both the dis-
trict attorney and the corporation counsel as prosecutor in the
same court inevitably creates disputes, duplication of effort and
the individual juveniles compiled by the Statistics and Survey Unit of DFY [hereinafter
cited as DFY Roster). This roster provides information on juveniles with DFY on restrictive
placements as well as the crimes for which they have been convicted.
235. Interview with Iris Coleman, Court Liaison Officer of DFY, Bronx County, in New
York City (Aug. 1, 1980). The secure facilities are: Goshen (75 beds), Brookwood (50 beds),
Mastar Park (15 beds), Tryon (20 beds for girls) and the Long Term Treatment Unit (14
beds). The 14 beds in the Long Term Treatment Unit are the only secure beds available in
the entire state for juveniles who need intensive psychiatric help.
236. See note 223 supra..
237. See DFY Roster, supra note 234. As of June 23, 1980, 133 juveniles were serving
three-year restrictive placements and 10 were serving five-year restrictive placements. 8 of
the 10 serving the five year placement were convicted of murder. Two juveniles were con-
victed of rape and robbery respectively presumably their third DFA offense. Interview with
Iris Coleman, Court Liaison Officer of DFY, Bronz County, in New York City (Oct. 10,
1980).
238. Interview with Iris Coleman, Court Liaison Officer of DFY, Bronx County, in New
York City (Aug. 1, 1980).
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confusion. Another relatively inexpensive reform would be to pho-
tograph and fingerprint every child who is arrested. This would
eliminate the current problem of erroneous identification of the ju-
venile offender, one which often plagues the court. Juveniles fre-
quently give false names, addresses, and ages, causing needless
time spent on ascertaining correct information. Understanding
that such photographic and fingerprint data could very well haunt
a juvenile in later life, these records should be destroyed when the
juvenile reaches the age of twenty-one unless he has been con-
victed of a serious crime, in which case the state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens would counterbalance any prejudice to the
juvenile.
Establishing a separate part of the family court to hear DFA pe-
titions3 9 has caused congestion within the rest of the juvenile
court system. DFA cases are relatively few in number 40 and, as a
rule, do not necessarily require lengthy trials. As a result, the DFA
parts usually have only two or three petitions on their calendars
whereas other trial parts carry fifteen to twenty. A wiser alterna-
tive would be to establish a separate trial part for cases expected
to involve lengthy trials, regardless of whether the cases are DFA
or non-DFA.
Legislative enactment of a new juvenile system is preferable to
the periodic reform of the present system. A first step could entail
a return to the pre-1967 law which made fifteen year-olds crimi-
nally responsible for murder and other capital crimes, thereby
treating them as adults. Under present law, murder is the crime
least likely to be removed and most likely to result in a full range
of punishment. A juvenile should additionally be charged with any
other lesser crimes related to the murder charge. A jury in such a
proceeding should be instructed that it can return a verdict on any
or all of the charges. A verdict on a charge other than murder or
manslaughter would result in removal to family court. Having all
but homicide cases originate in the juvenile system is practical in
view of the fact that the vast majority of the nonhomicides are
ultimately resolved in family court under current practice.
The family court should also be given more latitude in dealing
239. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
240. For example, in Bronx County in 1979, only 147 DFA's were filed-an average of
less than one per court day. See note 100 supra.
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with the worst juvenile offenders. This could be achieved by per-
mitting waiver upward of those juveniles not likely to benefit from
family court services,241 upon a motion by the prosecuting attorney
and after a hearing. This hearing would include, inter alia, a prob-
able cause inquiry into whether a crime had been committed, an
inquiry into the juvenile's record, the nature of the act, and the
juvenile's relative involvement. The logical cut-off point for waiver
upward is class C felonies. This would include all instances which
are presently considered DFA's and JO's in addition to attempts at
the most serious crimes. If the court were to order waiver, the min-
utes of the waiver hearing could then be read to the grand jury in
order to provide a basis for an indictment.
Waiver upward could also be ordered when a juvenile has been
absent from the jurisdiction for more than six months on a warrant
and it is unlikely that he will appear voluntarily. A "probable
cause" hearing could be conducted after a warrant officer has filed
a report detailing the efforts made to secure the juvenile's presence
before the court. This practice would close a gaping loophole in the
present law. DFY by law cannot accept a juvenile after his eight-
eenth birthday. Therefore, a juvenile approaching eighteen need
.only evade arrest on a warrant until his eighteenth birthday in or-
der to evade prosecution.
With regard to those cases not waived up to supreme court, it is
logical to discontinue the artificial distinction between the classes
of offenses that now constitute the DFA system. All cases involving
class C or greater felonies, and cases where the juvenile has three
or more prior felony convictions, should have available as a dispo-
sitional option a three-year restrictive placement.242
Any reforms that are instituted should also remedy the various
procedural problems that presently permeate the juvenile justice
system.2 43 Any discretion that is granted to juvenile agencies must
not deprive the juvenile of notice and an opportunity to be heard.
Similarly, although "equal protection does not demand that classi-
fications be ideal, 2 44 the distinctions that are drawn, whether on
241. Waiver upward into the adult system is used in most states. The minimum age for
this type of waiver is generally 13. See Peyser, supra note 5, at 1, col. 1.
242. A five-year restrictive placement should be available for class A felonies.
243. See notes 145-46, 213-17 supra and accompanying text.
244. Matter of Quinton A., 49 N.Y.2d 328, 337, 402 N.E.2d 142, 148, 425 N.Y.S.2d 788,
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the basis of age or type of crime, must bear rational relation to
legitimate state interests.2 45
New York has a valid state interest in protecting its citizens
from future Willie Boskets. However, a great injustice would result
if the legislature, in its zeal to criminalize the juvenile justice sys-
tem,246 loses sight of the fact that the system deals with children
and not adults. The majority of these delinquents are the products
of an impoverished and troubled environment. Despite its short-
comings, the family court system frequently offers these youths the
last opportunity for positive rehabilitation. Thus, an effective juve-
nile justice system should emphasize flexibility in its treatment in
order to protect society from violent juvenile criminals, while re-
maining a humane and rational institution.
793 (1980).
245. See Matter of James A., 424 N.Y.S.2d 334, 336 (Farn. Ct. 1980).
246. C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 335 (1978) ("After seventy-
five years of talk about substituting rehabilitation for punishment, it is difficult to find the
rehabilitation, and all too easy to find the punishment."). Similarly, with regard to adult
criminals, there is currently pending before the New York legislature a bill, which if en-
acted, would bring determinate sentencing to New York, N.Y.A. 8308, 202nd Sess. (1979).
Determinate sentencing, limits and structures the actions of sentencing so as to increase the
certainty of punishment. EXECUTIVE COMMISSON ON SENTENCING, supra note 223, at 212-13.
See generally Note, Proposal for Determinate Sentencing in New York: The Effect on an
Offender's Due Process Rights, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 629 (1980).
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